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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2A-3(2)(k) (1994) confer 
jurisdiction on the Utah Court of Appeals, inasmuch as this is a case transferred 
to the Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
These Respondents contend that Appellant has failed to accurately set forth 
the standard of review applicable to the issues which she raises in her Brief and 
by her appeal, contrary to the express provisions of Rule 24(a)(5) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such violation constitutes cause for Appellant's 
Brief to be disregarded or stricken (Utah R. App. P. 24(j)) and has forced the 
Respondents to speculate as to the exact basis for Appellants appeal and to provide 
the Court of Appeals with the missing standards of review required for 
consideration of the trial court's findings. Appellant has also failed to show, by 
citation to the record, or otherwise, that the issues raised in her Brief were 
preserved at the trial court level. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5). 
Appellant's Brief lists six (6) separate issues for review. The involvement 
of these Respondents (referred to throughout this Brief as "Respondents"), 
including the Endrody Trust, its trustee and various beneficiaries, is limited to 
the first issue raised in Appellant's Brief, which asserts that the trial court did not 
make adequate findings to support its decision and which also appears to assert 
that the trial court's findings are not supported by the evidence. Therefore, the 
scope of Respondents' Brief, in responding to Appellant's Brief, is limited to the 
adequacy of the trial court's findings and the evidence which supports those 
findings with respect to the trial court's decision that the assets of the Endrody 
Trust are the trust's separate property, are not marital assets of Appellant 
Carolyn Marie Endrody (hereafter referred to as "Mrs. Endrody") and 
Respondent Laszlo Endrody, Jr. (hereafter referred to as "Mr. Endrody"), and 
l 
are not available for distribution between those parties in their divorce action. 
Respondents will not address the other five (5) issues raised in Mrs. Endrody's 
Brief, except insofar as such other issues may relate to these Respondents. 
In light of the limited scope of this Brief, the issues presented and the 
corresponding standards of review are as follows: 
(1) Whether the trial court made adequate factual findings regarding the 
Endrody Trust's creation and its ownership of property and assets, to enable the 
Court of Appeals to ensure that the trial court's discretionary rulings were 
rationally based on the applicable factors for determining the ownership of 
property and assets, or, if the trial court's pronounced findings are found to be 
inadequate, whether the trial court record is clear and uncontroverted and/or 
unstated findings can be reasonably implied. The standard of review is a clearly 
erroneous standard. Barnes v. Barnes. 857 P.2d 257 (Utah App. 1993); Dunn v. 
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990); Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 
1993). 
(2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the 
following property is the separate property of the Endrody Trust: real property 
known as "Endrody Ranch" or the "Ranch Property", the Cedar City home, the 
Enoch home, the five (5) acre parcel, the Blue Sky Drive condominium (sold 
during pendency of trial court proceedings), cattle and items of equipment. The 
standard of review is an abuse of discretion standard, with deference to the trial 
court's findings of fact. Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1994); 
Howell v. HowelL 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App.) cert denied. 817 P.2d 325 (Utah 
1991). 
(3) Whether the trial court erred in concluding that property and assets 
owned by Endrody Trust were the separate properties of the trust and were not 
marital assets subject to, or available for, division between Mrs. Endrody and 
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Mr. Endrody in connection with their divorce proceedings. The standard of 
review is an independent review for correctness. Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 
1065 (Utah App. 1994); Mendez v. State Dept. of Social Services, 813 P.2d 1234 
(Utah App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991). 
(4) Whether Mrs. Endrody has met her burden, or is capable of meeting 
her burden, of showing that the trial court abused its discretion as to any of its 
findings or erred as to any of its conclusions, given the absence of the complete 
transcript from the trial court hearing on November 29, 1993. The standard of 
review is an independent application of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to 
the facts and record of this case. Horton v. Gem State Mutual of Utah, 794 P.2d 
847 (Utah App. 1990); Utah R. App. P. 11(e). 
(5) Whether Mrs. Endrody has failed to marshal the evidence in this 
case. The standard of review is an independent application of the Trial Court 
Record to the issues raised by Mrs. Endrody. Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836 
(Utah App. 1991). 
(6) Whether Mrs. Endrody's appeal of the trial court's decision relating 
to the Endrody Trust is frivolous, entitling Respondents to an award of 
reasonable attorneys fees and costs expended in this appeal. The standard of 
review is an independent application of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to 
the facts and record of this case. Horton v. Gem State Mutual of Utah, 794 P.2d 
847 (Utah App. 1990); Utah R. App. P. 33 and 34. 
RULES, STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES 
The authorities considered to be determinative of the issues raised in this 
appeal include Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2); Utah R. App. P. 33; Utah R. App. P. 34; 
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 562 P.2d 
235, 237 (Utah 1977) and Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980); 
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24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 896 (1990); 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts § 
101 (1992); 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts § 106 (1992). Citations will occur in the text 
of Respondents' Brief. Certain of the authorities referred to in this Brief are 
reproduced, in their entirety, in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal was taken by Mrs. Endrody from a Judgment and Decree 
entered on the 3rd day of October, 1994, in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in 
and for Iron County, State of Utah, by the Honorable J. Philip Eves. The case is 
essentially a divorce case, primarily involving issues of property division and 
spousal support, together with claims by Mrs. Endrody that she is entitled to a 
distribution of the assets of the Endrody Trust, based on her contention that such 
assets are somehow marital assets. 
Respondents dispute the facts set forth in Mrs. Endrody's Brief, under the 
heading Statement of the Case, inasmuch as such statements and facts deviate from 
the evidence placed before the trial court and selectively misstate, mischaracterize 
and take out of context the evidence, findings and holdings in this case.l 
Respondents adopt and incorporate the statement of facts and findings set 
forth in the trial court's Memorandum Decision (R 542-553, attached to 
Respondents' Brief as Addendum A), as the Statement of the Facts applicable to 
this case, with the exception of the following fact, which replaces and modifies 
any inconsistent findings contained in the trial court's Memorandum Decision: 
(A) The Defendant transferred his 1/3 interest in the ranch property to 
1
 Respondents will not attempt to address the numerous inaccurate statements and 
misrepresentations contained throughout Appellant's Brief. Such an undertaking would be 
extremely unfair and burdensome for Respondents, and should not be essential to the 
disposition of this case by the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as the standards of review 
applicable to the issues raised by Appellant's appeal appear calculated to protect 
Respondents from such unfounded and erroneous representations. Respondents have, 
however, taken extra care to provide the Court of Appeals with extensive citations to the 
Trial Court Record, in response to this concern. 
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the Endrody Trust on or about October 9, 1984, as a result of which all of the 
Ranch property had been conveyed to the Endrody Trust. (TE-D24 (Warranty 
Deed); R 575, f 2). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. The trial court made specific and detailed findings concerning the 
creation of the Endrody Trust and its ownership and acquisition of property and 
assets. These findings are set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision (R 
542), the transcript from a hearing held on November 29, 1993 (R 1365) and the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R 574). The detail and specificity of 
the trial court's findings enable the Court of Appeals, in reviewing this matter, to 
ensure that the trial court's discretionary rulings were rationally based on the 
applicable factors for determining ownership of the property and assets. 
II. The trial court is entitled to exercise broad discretion in divorce 
matters and the trial court's Findings of Fact in divorce cases are given great 
deference and are not to be overturned unless found to be clearly erroneous. 
Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257 (Utah App. 1993). Based on evidence presented 
to the trial court, it determined that the Endrody Trust is a valid inter vivos trust 
and is the owner of property known as the Endrody Ranch, together with a home 
in Cedar City, a home in Enoch, a 5 acre parcel, a condominium on Blue Sky 
Drive (sold during the pendency of the trial court proceedings), and various 
cattle and items of equipment. 
The findings of the trial court with respect to this issue are detailed and 
specific, and are set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision (R 542), the 
hearing transcript dated November 29, 1993 (R 1365) and the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law (R 574), which incorporates the Memorandum Decision. 
In addition, as it relates to the Endrody Trust's creation and ownership of 
property and assets, the evidence presented to the trial court, as demonstrated by 
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the Trial Court Record, is clear and substantially uncontroverted. 
The findings of the trial court are based on evidence which generally 
includes documents evidencing ownership of real property (TE-D24-Endrody 
Ranch; TE-D26-Cedar Home; TE-D27-5 acres; TE-D28-Enoch Home; TE-P7-
Blue Sky Drive condominium), documents evidencing the creation and operation 
of the Endrody Trust (TE-P9-Trust Agreement; TE-PlO-Resignation and 
Appointment of Successor Trustee; TE-P12-Lease Agreement on Ranch property; 
TE-P5 and P14- Endrody Trust Income Tax Returns (1985 through 1990, and 
1992)), documents showing the payment of rent from Mr. Endrody to the 
Endrody Trust for occupancy and use of trust properties (TE-P5 and PI 4-
Endrody Trust Tax Returns (1985 through 1990, and 1992); TE-P2 and P3-Mr. 
and Mrs. Endrody's personal tax returns) and significant amounts of testimony 
from Mr. Endrody, Patty Heinz (successor trustee), Matilda Endrody (a Trustor) 
and attorney Kent Corry (Trust formation counsel). 
Based upon the testimonies and exhibits placed before the trial court, its 
findings with respect to the creation and the property/assets of Endrody Trust do 
not constitute an abusive of discretion, but are fully supported by said 
documentation and evidence. Furthermore, the evidence on this issue is 
uncontroverted, enabling the Court of Appeals to reasonably imply findings, 
should it find the trial court findings inadequate. Hall v. HalL 858 P.2d 1018 
(Utah App. 1993). 
III. Upon finding the Endrody Trust was the owner of the Endrody 
Ranch, the Cedar City home, the Enoch Home, the 5 acre parcel, the Blue Sky 
Drive condominium, certain cattle and items of equipment, the trial court also 
determined that this separate property of Endrody Trust did not constitute 
marital assets and was not subject to, or available for, division between the 
divorcing parties. The trial court's conclusion was correct, inasmuch as the 
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above assets were the separate property of the Endrody Trust, and were not 
marital assets, subject to property division in the divorce proceedings of Mrs. 
Endrody and Mr. Endrody. This decision of the trial court is consistent with the 
evidence placed before the trial court, and is squarely within the confines of legal 
precedent. 
IV. Mrs. Endrody has failed to carry the burden of showing an abuse of 
discretion by the trial court, with respect to its findings and, furthermore, it 
appears that such a showing by Mrs. Endrody is not possible, inasmuch as Mrs. 
Endrody has failed to fulfill her obligation of providing the appellate court with a 
full and complete transcript or record of the trial court proceedings. 
Specifically, this case came before the trial court on November 29, 1993, 
for an additional day of trial/evidentiary hearing on the limited issues left 
unresolved by the trial court's Memorandum Decision. The transcript of this 
hearing, as contained in the Trial Court Record, contains only the trial court 
Judge's ruling, and excludes the presentation of any evidence or any other 
proceedings before the Court on November 29, 1993. 
In the absence of a complete record, it must be presumed that the trial 
court's ruling was based on sufficient facts and evidence. State v. $9,199.00, 791 
P.2d 2213 (Utah App. 1990); Horton v. Gem State Mutual of Utah. 794 P.2d 847 
(Utah App. 1990); Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 
776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989). 
V. As the party seeking to overturn the trial court's factual findings, 
Mrs. Endrody has the burden of marshaling the evidence which supports the trial 
court's findings and then demonstrating that, despite such evidence, the trial 
court's findings are nevertheless so lacking in support as to be against the clear 
weight of the evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous. Merely restating the 
theories upon which Mrs. Endrody relied and which Mrs. Endrody advanced in 
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the trial court; ignoring the evidence received by the trial court, while 
referencing only the portions of the record which appear favorable to Mrs. 
Endrody; or simply dismissing the evidence presented to the trial court as being 
unpersuasive or insufficient because it is contrary to the claims and theories 
advanced by Mrs. Endrody, constitutes failure to marshal the evidence. 
Substantial evidence exists and was presented to the trial court showing that 
the assets claimed by Endrody Trust are, in fact, the separate properties of 
Endrody Trust and are not marital assets of Mrs. Endrody and Mr. Endrody, 
despite Mrs. Endrody's refusal to recognize and address that evidence. The 
overwhelming majority of this evidence was uncontroverted and wholly 
consistent with the trial court's findings and conclusions. 
VI. Extensive evidence, both documentary and oral, was presented to the 
trial court regarding the creation and operations of Endrody Trust, together with 
its unquestioned ownership of property and assets. This evidence was essentially 
undisputed by Mrs. Endrody at the trial court level. Mrs. Endrody's appeal of 
the trial court's decision with respect to Endrody Trust is frivolous and without 
merit and the Respondents are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees 
and costs expended in this appeal, pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure 
33 and 34. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT MADE SPECIFIC AND DETAILED FINDINGS WHICH 
ENABLE THE COURT OF APPEALS TO ENSURE THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DISCRETIONARY RULINGS WERE RATIONALLY BASED AND DO NOT CONSTITUTE 
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
The trial court made specific and detailed findings regarding the creation 
and operations of Endrody Trust and its ownership of property and assets. The 
findings of the trial court are set out in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. Because the trial court issued an extensive Memorandum Decision (R 460-
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87), which contains a statement of the facts of the case as found by the trial court 
after trial, the facts and findings contained therein were incorporated into the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as Exhibit A (R 575). In fact, Mrs. 
Endrody's counsel discussed such an incorporation of the Memorandum Decision 
with the trial court judge. (R 1372-73). Additional findings of the trial court are 
contained in the incomplete hearing transcript for November 29, 1993. (R 1365-
75) 
A sample of the findings made by the trial court with regard to the 
Endrody Trust property, and references to those findings within the Trial Court 
Record, are as follows: 
A. CREATION AND VALIDITY OF ENDRODY TRUST 
The Endrody Trust was created by written trust agreement in 1984, and 
Mr. Endrody and the trustors (Mr. Endrody's parents) conveyed their interest in 
the ranch property to Mr. Endrody as trustee of Endrody Trust. (R 463). The 
trial court further found that Mr. Endrody had ceased acting as trustee of the 
Endrody Trust "and his daughter by prior marriage has been properly appointed 
as trustee." (R 466) 
The trial court further found that the Endrody Trust was a valid inter 
vivos trust and "was treated by all concerned as a separate legal entity, the proper 
forms were observed, and the defendant [Mr. Endrody] was under a continuing 
duty as trustee to perform properly his fiduciary duties." (R 480) 
B. OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY 
In addition to other findings, the trial court made the following findings 
with respect to the Endrody Trust's ownership of real property: 
1. Ranch Property. The ranch property was purchased by Mr. 
Endrody's parents in 1970, as they made the down payment of 
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$25,000.00 and paid the property off with annual payments. (R 462) 
Mr. Endrody paid rent to his parents for the right to occupy and use 
the ranch property, which rent was almost sufficient to make the 
annual payments, but did require that his parents contribute some of 
their own funds in order to make those annual payments. (R 462) 
The trustors of the trust and Mr. Endrody conveyed their interest in 
the ranch property to the Endrody Trust when the trust was created. 
(R 463, 575) Thereafter, Mr. Endrody paid rent for his use of the 
property to the Endrody Trust. (R 481-482) 
2. Cedar City home. This home was acquired in 1982 by Mrs. 
Endrody and Mr. Endrody, with marital funds and title to the home 
was taken in the names of the parties minor children-Michael and 
Linda, with Mrs. Endrody and Mr. Endrody as trustees. (R 468). 
The trial court also found that this home was conveyed to the 
Endrody Trust in 1988, with the agreement of both Mrs. Endrody 
and Mr. Endrody and Mrs. Endrody was issued 70 trust shares as a 
result of said conveyance. (R 468) Thereafter, the parties paid rent 
and have been assessed rent during any occupancy. (R 468) 
3. Five (5) Acres. "During the marriage the defendant (Mr. 
Endrody) bought 5 acres of land in Enoch City which was paid for 
with [Endrody] Trust funds and deeded to the defendant as trustee 
for the Trust." (R 468) 
4. Enoch City home. The Enoch home was purchased during the 
marriage, was paid for by Endrody Trust funds and title taken by 
Mr. Endrody as trustee for the trust. (R 468) As with the Cedar 
City home, the parties were assessed rent during any periods of 
occupancy, including Mrs. Endrody's occupancy during the . 
approximately three (3) years in which this case was pending in the 
trial court. (R 468) The trial court further found that the Endrody 
Trust had continued to assess rent during the pendency of this action, 
at the previously agreed-upon rate; that rent obligations up to 
December 31, 1991, were the obligation of Mr. Endrody as a means 
of temporary support; and that Mrs. Endrody should be responsible 
for payment of one-half of the rent owed during the years 1992 and 
1993, with Mr. Endrody responsible for the other half. (R 1368) 
The court found the amount of rent owed to the trust for occupancy 
of the Enoch home during 1992 and 1993 to be $20,400.00 ($850.00 
per month for 24 months). (R 578) 
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5. Blue Skv Drive condominium. "During the marriage the 
[Endrody] Trust bought a home on Blue Sky Drive in Enoch City 
which was paid for with Trust funds and for the use of which the 
Trust collected rent. That home has been sold be [sic] the Trust, 
through Patty Heinz as trustee, during the pendency of these 
proceedings to reduce the debt of the Trust." (R 469) 
C. OWNERSHIP OF EQUIPMENT AND CATTLE 
The trial court made the following finding with respect to equipment: 
With regard to the equipment that we've discussed this morning, 
there is no dispute as to the list of equipment or as to the values. (R 
1366 (Hearing Transcript, November 29, 1993 , page 2)) 
This finding was made after trial had been completed, in August of 1993, and 
after the November 29, 1993, hearing, during which the trial court received 
additional evidence. (R 530) Throughout these proceedings, it was 
uncontroverted that the Endrody Trust was the owner of certain pieces of 
equipment, which equipment was not disputed as the court considered and divided 
the list of equipment agreed upon by the parties. (R 1366) 
No findings were made with respect to the Trust's ownership of cattle, 
however, as set forth hereafter, the only evidence presented to the trial court was 
uncontroverted with respect to this subject, and Mrs. Endrody did not dispute that 
Mr. Endrody had sold all of the parties cattle prior to trial, leaving only Trust 
cattle at the ranch property. 
D. SEPARATENESS OF ENDRODY TRUST 
The trial court made the following findings regarding the separation of 
Endrody Trust from the personal affairs of Mrs. Endrody and Mr. Endrody: 
1. After the creation of the Trust, the defendant [Mr. Endrody] 
continued to make improvements to the Ranch, to buy and sell farm 
equipment, to supply the seed, labor and electrical power needs of 
the Ranch, to farm and raise livestock, and to pay rental payments to 
the Trust for the use of the land and water. (R 464-65) 
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2. The parties and the Trust filed separate tax returns,. . . (R 465) 
3. The [Endrody] Trust was treated by all concerned as a separate 
legal entity, the proper forms were observed, and the defendant [Mr. 
Endrody] was under a continuing duty as trustee to perform 
properly his fiduciary duties. The defendant bought and sold and 
financed and paid for property as trustee of the trust and there is no 
showing that he commingled the affairs of the Trust and his personal 
affairs. (R 480) 
The trial court's Memorandum Decision also includes the following 
findings regarding the payment of rent by Mr. Endrody to the Endrody Trust: 
Inherent in plaintiffs position is the claim that the payments of rent 
which the parties made to the Trust for the use of Trust property 
were somehow improper and constituted impermissible augmentation 
of the Trust with marital property. . . . The evidence has convinced 
this court that the rental agreements were legitimate bargains 
between the parties and the Trust, even though defendant acted on 
both sides of the transactions. In each instance the parties were 
granted a leasehold interest in the property in question, be it a house 
or the Ranch. The parties actually paid the rent and were held 
responsible by the Trust for those payments, the court finds that the 
plaintiff has failed to prove that the rents were unreasonable or that 
they were not given in exchange for a return benefit of comparable 
value which both parties enjoyed. In essence, the Trust was in the 
same position as any other landlord vis-avis these parties. (R 481-
82) 
The clearly erroneous standard which is required of Mrs. Endrody, if she 
is to show that the trial court's findings are insufficient, is only met if a trial 
court finding violates the standards set by the appellate court, is against the clear 
weight of the evidence, or the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed. Cummings v. Cummings. 821 P.2d 472, 476 
(Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
Insofar as this standard places a burden on Mrs. Endrody, she has clearly failed 
to carry that burden, inasmuch as no showing has been made that the trial court 
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violated any standards set by the appellate court, nor has there been a showing 
that the trial court's findings are against the clear weight of the evidence-which 
consideration is dealt with more fully in Argument II, infra. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT ENDRODY TRUST IS A VALID 
INTER VIVOS TRUST AND THAT CERTAIN PROPERTY AND ASSETS ARE THE 
SEPARATE PROPERTY OF ENDRODY TRUST ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
AND DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION; FURTHERMORE, THE TRIAL 
COURT RECORD IS CLEAR AND UNCONTROVERTED AND UNSTATED FINDINGS TO 
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION CAN BE REASONABLY IMPLIED 
The trial court's findings are overwhelmingly supported by the evidence 
presented during the trial court proceedings. In addition, the evidence received 
by the trial court was almost entirely uncontroverted with respect to Endrody 
Trust and justifies the Court of Appeals in implying reasonable findings, in the 
event that the trial court findings are found to be insufficient. Hall v. Hall, supra. 
A. EVIDENCE SUPPORTING TRIAL COURT FINDINGS 
The trial court's findings, as referenced in Argument I, supra, are 
supported by the following evidence presented to the trial court: 
1. Creation and Validity of Endrodv Trust. The trial court received a 
copy of the Endrody Trust's Trust Agreement (TE-P9), evidencing the creation 
of the trust on or about October 5, 1984 and establishing the provisions 
governing that trust. In addition, the trial court heard testimony from Mr. 
Endrody (TT 119), Matilda Endrody (TT 367-368, 379-380), and attorney Kent 
Corry (TT 424, 433-435 and 439-440), corroborating the creation of Endrody 
Trust and the intent of the Trustors, Matilda Endrody and Laszlo Endrody, Sr., 
in creating the trust. There was no contradicting evidence presented to the trial 
court. 
The trial court also received evidence showing that the Endrody Trust was 
a valid inter vivos trust, which had met its required formalities. (Mr. Endrody 
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TT 175-184; Patty Heinz TT 397-399; Kent Corry TT 426-428, 433-435; TE-P9, 
P10) This evidence was clear and substantially uncontroverted. 
2. Ownership of Property. The trial court's findings with respect to the 
Endrody Trust's ownership of real property, are supported by the following 
evidence: 
a) Ranch Property. The ranch property was purchased by Mr. 
Endrody's parents in 1970, as they made the down payment of 
$25,000.00 and paid the property off with annual payments. (Mr. 
Endrody TT 27-28, 31;Matilda Endrody TT 363-364, 376-378, 382-
383) Mr. Endrody paid rent to his parents for the right to occupy 
and use the ranch property, which rent was supplemented by his 
parents' contribution of their personal funds in order to make those 
annual payments. (Mr. Endrody R 654, TT 28, 31, 156-158; 
Matilda Endrody TT 364-365, 369-370, 377-378). The debt on the 
ranch property was retired in 1981. (Mr. Endrody TT 31) Mr. 
Endrody's parents, as the trustors of the trust, and Mr. Endrody 
conveyed their interest in the ranch property to the Endrody Trust 
upon its creation in 1984. (TE-D24 ) After the debt on the property 
was retired, Mr. Endrody continued to pay rent on the ranch 
property during all times that he used the property to conduct his 
farming operations. (Mr. Endrody TT 158-159, ; Matilda Endrody 
TT 367; TE-P2, P3, P5, D12 and D14) No contradictory evidence 
was presented to the trial court. 
b) Cedar City home. This home was acquired in 1982 by Mrs. 
Endrody and Mr. Endrody, with marital funds and title to the home 
was taken in the names of the parties minor children—Michael and 
Linda, with Mrs. Endrody and Mr. Endrody as trustees. (Mr. 
Endrody TT 72-73; Mrs. Endrody TT 205). The home was 
conveyed to the Endrody Trust in 1988, by both Mrs. Endrody and 
Mr. Endrody, with Mrs. Endrody receiving 70 shares in the Trust. 
(Mr. Endrody TT 80; Mrs. Endrody TT 205, 256; TE-D26) 
Thereafter, the parties paid rent to Endrody Trust and have been 
assessed rent during any periods of occupancy, in the amount of 
$400.00 per month. (Mr. Endrody TT 163-164, 510-511; Patty 
Heinz TT 391, 409). No contradictory evidence was presented to the 
trial court. 
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c) Five (5) Acres. The Endrody Trust bought 5 acres of land in 
Enoch City which was paid for with Endrody Trust funds and 
deeded to the defendant as trustee for the Trust. (Mr. Endrody TT 
75-76; TE-D27). No contradictory evidence was presented to the 
trial court. 
d) Enoch City home. The Enoch home was purchased in 1987, was 
paid for by Endrody Trust funds and title was taken by Mr. Endrody 
as trustee for the trust. (TE-D28) The parties were assessed rent 
during any periods of occupancy, including Mrs. Endrody's 
occupancy during the approximately three (3) years in which this 
case was pending in the trial court, in the amount of $850.00 per 
month. (Mr. Endrody TT 162; Patty Heinz TT 391, 409-410). Mrs. 
Endrody testified that she did not know whether the Endrody Trust 
had purchased this home. (Mrs. Endrody TT 257). No 
contradictory evidence was presented to the trial court. 
e) Blue Sky Drive condominium. A condominium on Blue Sky 
Drive in Enoch City, was purchased by the Trust with Trust funds 
and was titled in the name of the Trust. (Mr. Endrody TT 84; TE-
P7) The Trust collected rent for use or occupation of the 
condominium at a rate of $450.00 per month. (Mr. Endrody TT 
163) This condominium was sold by the Trust, through Patty Heinz 
as trustee, during the pendency of these proceedings to reduce the 
debt of the Trust. (Patty Heinz TT 401; TE-P7) Mrs. Endrody 
testified that she believed that the Trust had purchased this property. 
(Mrs. Endrody TT 257) No contradictory evidence was presented to 
the trial court. 
3. Ownership of Equipment and Cattle. There is very little evidence in the 
Trial Court Record regarding the equipment of the Trust. The trial court did 
receive testimony that a 4630 John Deere tractor belonged to the Trust (Mr. 
Endrody TT 87). In addition, there were certain items contained on the 
equipment list of Mrs. Endrody which were not included in the equipment 
divided between the divorcing parties due to the apparent understanding or 
agreement that those items belonged to Endrody Trust. (Robert J. Overson TT 
269 (referring to TE-P17)). 
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After trial had been completed, in August of 1993, and at the conclusion of 
the November 29, 1993, hearing, the trial court found that "With regard to the 
equipment that we've discussed this morning, there is no dispute as to the list of 
equipment or as to the values." (R 1366 (Hearing Transcript, November 29, 
1993 , page 2)). This finding, combined with the evidence received by the trial 
court, demonstrates the absence of any contrary evidence and the acquiescence of 
the parties as to ownership of equipment. 
Similarly, there was very little evidence concerning the Trust's ownership 
of cattle. It appears that the only evidence on this subject was testimony from 
Mr. Endrody and Patty Heinz, that the Trust acquired cattle from beneficiaries of 
the Trust by retaining one-half of the calf crop in return for the care and feeding 
of each beneficiaries' cattle. (Mr. Endrody TT 103-104, 166; Patty Heinz TT 
390). There was no conflicting testimony on this subject and no dispute appears 
on the record. 
4. Separateness of Endrody Trust. In general, the trial court found a 
separation between the affairs of Mrs. Endrody and Mr. Endrody and the affairs 
of the Endrody Trust. The following evidence supports the finding of the trial 
court: 
a) Mr. Endrody was consistently required to pay rent to the 
Endrody Trust for use and occupancy, by him and his family, of any 
Trust owned property, including rent which accrued during the 
pendency of this action. (Mr. Endrody R 653, TT 28, 87-88, 98, 
156-161, 185, 450, 478, 503; Patty Heinz TT 390-391; TE-P5 and 
P14) 
b) Mrs. Endrody and Mr. Endrody filed their tax returns 
separately from Endrody Trust, and the tax returns verify the 
payment of rent from Mr. Endrody to the Endrody Trust. (TE-P2, 
P3 and TE-P5, P14) 
c) The evidence provided to the trial court, as set forth in this 
Argument II, supports the findings of the trial court. In addition, 
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Mrs. Endrody failed to present any evidence that would demonstrate 
that Mr. Endrody failed in his duty as trustee to fulfill his fiduciary 
duties. As set forth above, properties were bought, sold, financed 
and paid for by the respective trustees, in the name of the Trust. 
Furthermore, there was no showing that Mr. Endrody commingled 
the affairs of the Trust and his personal affairs. 
This evidence was, once again, uncontroverted within the Trial Court Record. 
The clearly erroneous standard which is required of Mrs. Endrody, if she 
is to show that the trial court's findings are improper, is only met if a trial court 
finding violates the standards set by the appellate court, is against the clear weight 
of the evidence, or the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed. Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah 
App. 1991) (citing State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). There is no 
question that the trial court's findings conform to the appellate court's established 
standards and that the findings are supported by the clear weight of the evidence, 
which in most instances was uncontroverted. Therefore, the findings must be 
affirmed. 
B. EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT WAS CLEAR AND 
I INCONTROVERTED AND SUPPORTS THE REASONABLE IMPLICATION OF 
ANY NECESSARY BUT UNSTATED FINDINGS 
The trial court was presented with evidence which, with respect to Mrs. 
Endrody's claims against Endrody Trust, was clear and uncontroverted. This 
evidence included oral testimony from Mr. Endrody, Patty Heinz (trustee), 
Matilda Endrody and Kent Corry (Trust formation counsel), together with 
documentary evidence, including numerous Trial Exhibits. In accordance with 
Hall v. HalL 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), Respondents request that the Court 
of Appeals reasonably imply any necessary findings which may not have been 
stated by the trial court, in the event that the Court of Appeals determines that the 
trial court's findings do not provide adequate detail or specificity. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT THE ENDRODY TRUST IS 
A VALID TRUST MANDATES ITS HOLDING THAT THE SEPARATE PROPERTY AND 
ASSETS OF ENDRODY TRUST ARE NOT MARITAL ASSETS SUBJECT TO, OR 
AVAILABLE FOR, DIVISION IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS 
As a result of the trial court's findings with respect to Endrody Trust's 
ownership of property and assets, as set forth in Argument I, supra, which 
findings are supported by the evidence, as set forth in Argument II, supra, the 
trial court ultimately held that "[t]he plaintiff has been unable to direct the court 
to any authority which would allow this court to invalidate or set aside the Trust 
under the circumstances of this case", (R 478) and "the Trust is a valid inter vivos 
trust and that the claims of the plaintiff against the Trust, its beneficiaries, and its 
trustee are unsupported. Those claims are hereby ordered dismissed." (R 480) 
A. THE SEPARATE PROPERTY OF ENDRODY TRUST IS NOT SUBJECT TO OR 
AVAILABLE FOR DIVISION IN THE DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS OF MRS. 
ENDRODY AND MR. ENDRODY 
Having so held, the trial court further held that "[accordingly the property 
held by the Trust, including the 2/3 interest in the Ranch [later determined to be 
the entire ranch property], the Cedar City house, the 5 acres in Enoch, the Enoch 
house, and the personal property belonging to the Trust are not available for 
distribution between the parties as marital assets as those items of property belong 
to a third party." (R480) This holding is correct as a matter of law, as 
illustrated by 76 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation. §896 (1983), which 
provides that "[s]ome property ostensibly owned by divorcing spouses may not be 
divisible because it is neither marital nor separate property but is the property of 
a third person." Such is exactly the situation in this case. 
Mrs. Endrody's fundamental error and misunderstanding of this distinction 
is typified by the statement within her brief, at page 11, that "[a] careful review 
of six hundred thirty-eight (638) pages of transcript taken during the trial of this 
matter does not reveal what evidence the Trial Court used to determine that the 
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marital property placed in the trust was not marital property that should be 
awarded to plaintiff." (Emphasis added) The trial court concluded that the 
property of the Endrody Trust is that entity's separate property and is not marital 
property of Mrs. Endrody and Mr. Endrody. This conclusion was supported by 
the evidence and mandated by the trial court's findings. Consequently, there is no 
marital property in the trust, which could, or should, be awarded to Mrs. 
Endrody or Mr. Endrody. 
This principle is further embodied in the cases of Hamilton v. Hamilton, 
562 P.2d 235, 237 (Utah 1977) and Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 P.2d 326, 328 
(Utah 1980). In both of these cases the Utah Supreme Court held that the assets 
which are subject to division are the marital assets which are owned or held in the 
name(s) of the parties at the time of the decree or termination of the marriage. 
Consistent with these cases, the assets which were acquired or conveyed into 
Endrody Trust prior to the decree or termination of the marriage ot Mrs. 
Endrody and Mr. Endrody are not marital assets subject to division—of this there 
can be no dispute. Accordingly, none of the property and assets discussed within 
this Brief can be said to constitute marital property, which is subject to division 
in the parties divorce action. 
Respondents do not dispute the equitable powers and obligations of the trial 
court in divorce matters, and more particularly in dividing marital assets of the 
parties. Haumont v. Haumont 793 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1990). Furthermore, 
Respondents do not dispute that, where equity requires, even the separate 
property of one spouse may be divided or awarded to the other spouse. Watson 
v. Watson. 837 P.2d 1 (Utah 1992). However, this line of Utah cases specifies 
that "marital property encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed bv 
the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived." Gardner v. 
Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added). Hence, the courts 
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recognize that their equitable power and obligation is not limitless. By the 
express language of the Utah courts, equity must be confined to the assets 
possessed by the parties. Thus, property owned or possessed by persons or 
entities outside of the divorcing parties should not be included. 
In the instant action, neither Mrs. Endrody nor Mr. Endrody own or 
possess the assets of the Endrody Trust. Mr. Endrody is a beneficiary of the 
Trust and is the owner of certain shares, subject to the provisions of the trust 
agreement. Consequently, the assets of Endrody Trust do not fall within the 
circle of marital property, nor are such assets the separate property of either of 
the divorcing parties, nor are they assets possessed by the parties and subject to 
division or distribution. 
It should be added that the trial court did exercise its equitable powers and 
obligations by awarding Mrs. Endrody one-half of Mr. Endrody's shares in 
Endrody Trust, which were acquired during the marriage, by imposition of a 
constructive trust. This equitable ruling was made despite the fact that such 
shares might be classified as the separate property of Mr. Endrody, obtained by 
gift or inheritance. Thus the trial court awarded Mrs. Endrody an equitable 
division of the assets possessed by the parties. 
B. THERE IS NO BASIS UPON WHICH THE COURT MAY INVALIDATE. SET ASIDE 
OR INVADE THE PROPERTY OR ASSETS OF ENDRODY TRUST 
The trial court held that M[t]he plaintiff has been unable to direct the court 
to any authority which would allow this court to invalidate or set aside the Trust 
under the circumstances of this case." (TT 478) Mrs. Endrody urges the court 
to set aside or invade the Endrody Trust based on one of three theories. First, 
due to her belief that Mr. Endrody has placed marital assets in the Trust. The 
trial court correctly held that f,[e]ven if such is the case, it is no basis for setting 
aside a Trust created by third party trustors for the benefit of the parties, as well 
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as other beneficiaries unrelated to this divorce action." (R 478) The trial court 
was unwilling to set aside or invade the Trust based on this theory and 
appropriately held that a trust may be set aside or invaded by a court only in very 
limited circumstances, which circumstances did not exist in this case, and that the 
court must protect and preserve the intent of the trustors. 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts 
§ 101 (1992). 
Second, Mrs. Endrody urges the court to set aside or invade the Endrody 
Trust due to alleged misconduct or violation of trust formalities by the respective 
trustees. The trial court received evidence with respect to Mrs. Endrody's 
allegations. (Mr. Endrody TT 175-184; Patty Heinz TT 397-399; TE-P9, P10) 
76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts § 106 (1992), states the general rule that "[a] trust does not 
terminate or lapse merely by reason of misconduct or violation of the trust by the 
trustee, his inability to administer the trust, or his neglect of, inattention to, or 
abandonment of the trust, or an improper lease of the trust property." The trial 
court followed this general rule in rejecting Mrs. Endrody's second theory. (R 
479) 
Third, Mrs. Endrody urged the court to set aside or invade the Trust based 
on the alter ego doctrine. The trial court refused to set aside or invade the Trust 
based on this theory, due to its determination that the Trust "is obviously not the 
alter ego of the defendant, even though he enjoyed broad powers as trustee and 
majority shareholder of the Trust. The evidence demonstrates that the Trust 
included property of other parties which was managed by defendant for the 
benefit of the Trust and its beneficiaries." (R 479) In addition, the alter ego 
doctrine is a corporate invasion doctrine, as demonstrated by the cases cited and 
summarized in Mrs. Endrody's Brief (pages 14-16). This doctrine lacks 
application and legal precedent within a trust setting. 
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C. THE TRIAL COURT WAS PROVIDED WITH SUFFICIENT DOCUMENTATION. 
INSOFAR AS NECESSARY. TO DETERMINE THAT LEASE/RENT PAYMENTS 
WERE AN OBLIGATION OF MR. ENDRODY 
Much is made by Mrs. Endrody of the fact that Mr. Endrody made rental 
payments to the Endrody Trust for his use and possession of the Endrody Ranch 
property, and for his family's use of the Cedar City and Enoch residences. Mrs. 
Endrody claims that the trial court improperly considered and accepted evidence 
classifying payments to Endrody Trust as rent, without requiring documentary or 
written evidence to support such classification, citing the case of Godfrey v. 
Godfrey. 854 P.2d 585 (Utah App. 1993). 
Even if Mrs. Endrody's reliance on Godfrey were correct, the individual 
and Trust tax returns and the lease agreement presented to the trial court (TE-P2, 
P3, P5, D12 and PI4) constitute written evidence of the obligation and actual 
payment of rent, particularly when combined with the testimony which explains 
the reason for such payments. See Argument II.B. The trial court ultimately 
found that 
Inherent in plaintiffs position is the claim that the payments of rent 
which the parties made to the Trust for the use of Trust property 
were somehow improper and constituted impermissible augmentation 
of the Trust with marital property. . . . The evidence has convinced 
this court that the rental agreements were legitimate bargains 
between the parties and the Trust, even though defendant acted on 
both sides of the transactions. In each instance the parties were 
granted a leasehold interest in the property in question, be it a house 
or the Ranch. The parties actually paid the rent and were held 
responsible by the Trust for those payments. The court finds that the 
plaintiff has failed to prove that the rents were unreasonable or that 
they were not given in exchange for a return benefit of comparable 
value which both parties enjoyed. In essence, the Trust was in the 
same position as any other landlord vis-avis these parties. (R 481-
82) 
Furthermore, regardless of the application of Godfrey. Mrs. Endrody's 
position is erroneous, as demonstrated by the case of Baker v. Baker. 866 P.2d 
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540, 543 (Utah App. 1993). In Baker it was argued that an obligation owed to 
the parents of the divorcing husband was not truly an obligation inasmuch as 
there was no note evidencing the obligation and the only evidence presented to the 
court was testimony of the divorcing husband that the monies were owed and that 
he intended to pay that money back. 
The Court of Appeals held that this was a bona fide marital obligation 
despite the absence of written proof, because the divorcing wife knew of the 
obligation and there was testimony that the divorcing husband intended to repay 
the funds to his parents. The Court of Appeals also held that the oral testimony 
was sufficient evidence to support the finding of an obligation and that the 
evidence presented prohibited an appellate court determination that the trial 
court's finding of an obligation was clearly erroneous. 
A similar ruling would be required in this action, inasmuch as all evidence 
presented to the trial court supports the historical payment of rent, the existence 
of the agreement and obligation to pay rent, and both Mr. Endrody and the 
Endrody Trust have indicated their intentions to see that the rent obligations are 
paid in full. 
IV. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MEET HER BURDEN AND/OR IS 
INCAPABLE OF MEETING HER BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, IN THE ABSENCE OF THE COMPLETE TRIAL COURT 
RECORD, INCLUDING A FULL TRANSCRIPT FROM THE NOVEMBER 29, 1993, 
TRIAL/EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
Rule 11(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that Mrs. 
Endrody request a transcript from the reporter within ten (10) days after the 
filing of the Notice of Appeal, or if certain parts of the record are not to be 
requested, that a certificate to that effect be filed with the Trial and Appellate 
Courts. As of the date of this Brief, Mrs. Endrody has failed to request, and has 
not placed in the Trial Court Record, a complete transcript from the proceedings 
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before the trial court on November 29, 1993. Mrs. Endrody has also failed to 
file a certificate identifying those proceedings for which transcripts would not be 
produced. 
The trial court's Memorandum Decision contained the Court's Findings of 
Fact and its ruling as to various issues. In addition, the Court identified certain 
issues which it was unable to fully resolve without additional evidence and/or 
testimony, requiring additional proceedings in the case. (R 485-486) In order to 
provide the parties with an opportunity to present such evidence and/or testimony 
on these limited issues, the trial court scheduled an additional date for 
trial/evidentiary hearing on November 29, 1993. (R 529) Sometime after that 
date, and to aid in the review/preparation of Findings of Fact, Respondents 
requested the preparation of a transcript from the court reporter to include only 
the Judge's ruling. The evidentiary proceedings before the trial court on 
November 29, 1993, were not, and have not, been reproduced and are not 
contained within the Trial Court Record. The only record of those proceedings 
other than the partial transcript, is a minute entry which reflects the presentation 
of additional evidence. (R 530) 
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that "[i]f 
the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported 
by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a 
transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the 
court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing 
the relevant portions of the transcript." (Emphasis added) 
Clearly Mrs. Endrody's appeal urges that "a finding or conclusion is 
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence." It is Mrs. Endrody's burden to 
show that the trial court was clearly erroneous or that it abused its discretion. 
Absent the complete transcript(s) of the trial court proceedings, the Trial Court 
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Record is devoid of the arguments, testimony and evidence presented to the trial 
court, and the reasoning of the trial court in making its findings and rulings. In 
light of the incomplete record before the this Court, it must be presumed that the 
trial court's findings and rulings were based on sufficient facts and evidence. 
State v. $9.199.00. 791 P.2d 213 (Utah App. 1990); Horton v. Gem State Mutual 
of Utah. 794 P.2d 847 (Utah App. 1990); Sampson v. Richins. 770 P.2d 998 
(Utah App.) cert, denied. 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989). 
Consequently, Mrs. Endrody has not and cannot meet the burden required 
to set aside the trial court's findings or rulings, which matters must remain as 
determined by the trial court. 
V. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE 
As the party seeking to overturn the trial court's factual findings, Mrs. 
Endrody has the burden of marshaling the evidence which supports the Court's 
findings and then demonstrating that, despite such evidence, the Court's findings 
are nevertheless so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous. Baker v. Baker. 866 P.2d 540, 543 
(Utah App. 1994) (citing Crouse v. Crouse. 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 
1991)); Hagan v. Hagan. 810 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1991). Mrs. Endrody does 
not succeed in marshaling the evidence. Instead, she refers the Court of Appeals 
only to the evidence which conflicts or potentially conflicts with the trial court's 
findings. Riche v. Riche. 784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989). 
A review of the Trial Court Record, as summarized in Arguments II and 
IE, supra, clearly demonstrates that Mrs. Endrody has merely reargued only the 
evidence which she alleges to support her position, which does not constitute 
marshaling of the evidence. Schaumberg v. Schaumberg. 875 P.2d 598 (Utah 
App. 1994). In addition, Mrs. Endrody has not properly marshaled the evidence 
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 c u idi court was uncontroverted, 
when ID lact she sinipiv ^ n o r o :>. contradictory testimony of opposing parties 
or exhibits contrary to her position. Watson v. Watson. $}~* P.Id I (Utah 
1992) Fi lithermoi e. I\ li s Endrody's citation o • - */nee whicn Mie 
considers supportive of the outcome which she ...-^i\.-. \;. ,,. using to 
acknowledge contrary evidence upon which the trial , on:-* ,,-:: !. i aid. ^el\ in 
Crouse v. Grouse, S1 7 P 2d !S?o i L'ta* 
In ^hort, M r 1 n-* od\ has refused \o acknowledge the evidence which 
suppo •- il- i-- • . ' i « l m ^ s 
t.ick support in the evidence. All o; the loregoing ac:- ^ - .ndnxly 
constitute a failure m n. i -hal the evidence and requuc that the Court of Appeals 
l i l t w * -
vi. /\rrm.i.^.N i ^ APPEAL OP JUL i'RiAL - *:>UJ.V i\l:i 
TO THE PROPERTY AND ASSETS OF ENDRODY TRL : . LOUS AND 
RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF REASONABLE ATTORNEY S FEES 
AND COSTS EXPENDED IN THIS APPEAL. 
Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "if the 
1
 determines that a Motion made or appeal taken, under these rules is either 
AS at I MI ii sla } it shall A\\ mil (inisl damages will in In IIIIM^ >< hide MIII'IT OH 
ble costs , and/or reasonable attorney's fees, to the prevailing party. The 
^i- ** nay order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's 
attorney.1 
In addition, Rule 34(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides 
that "...if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against Appellant 
i mless oinc 
The content ol \\- - numerous citations to the Trial Court Record contained 
within Arguments I and II of Respondents' Brief, demonstrate the following facts 
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and circumstances: 
(a) substantial evidence was presented to the trial court, both by 
documents and by testimony, regarding the creation, operation and property/asset 
ownership of Endrody Trust. (Argument II, supra) 
(b) Mrs. Endrody failed to dispute or controvert said evidence in any 
material way, in the trial court proceedings. (Argument II, supra) 
(c) Despite the uncontroverted evidence at the trial court level, Mrs. 
Endrody has appealed the trial court's findings and ruling with respect to 
Endrody Trust. (Argument II, supra) 
(d) Mrs. Endrody has failed to provide the Appellate Court with a 
complete record of the trial court proceedings by excluding or failing to provide 
transcripts for certain hearings or portions of hearings. (Arguments II and IV, 
supra) 
(e) Mrs. Endrody's has failed to marshal the evidence as demonstrated 
by her Brief which excludes and fails to acknowledge the presentation of evidence 
favorable to Endrody Trust and supportive of the trial court's findings and 
conclusions with respect to Endrody Trust and its ownership of property and 
assets. (Arguments II and V, supra) 
(f) Mrs. Endrody's Brief is riddled with deviations, misstatements and 
mischaracterizations of the evidence, findings and conclusions which are 
contained in the trial court proceedings. Such deviations, misstatements and 
mischaracterizations are unfair to the Court of Appeals and the other litigants, 
and are exposed upon actual review of the Trial Court Record. 
These circumstances support the position of Respondents that Mrs. 
Endrody's appeal, with respect to this issue, is frivolous and without merit. 
Consequently, Respondents respectfully request that the Court award Respondents 
their reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in this appeal. 
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4a^ i *p uie lacis of this case. ;ne fore lining arguments ind the evidence 
ni^ in . i^r. - . - ^ -v >rd. Respondents 
pectfully request uuu aie i/ian i'nun M Appeals ainrni ia^ ^ecision of the 
Fifth Judicial District Court, as reflected b\ ihe inn: . am - Memorandum 
. ; c » o i o ; i . . . ' j i i 
••spondents nirther reuueM that uic l \ah * • an -i Appeals award 
Re^ * :u'^nts their reasonable attorney's fees and expenses incurred as a result of 
this appeal r\ .1. . „ -. - / . 
RESPECTFCLL , SUBMITTED this _ ? ^ day of June, 1995. 
SNO^JUFFER, ENGSJRQM. DRAKE, WADE & SMART 
A Professional Corporation 
MICHAEL AlQA^ 
Attorneys foV Respon 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the / day of June. 1995.1 served lkz> (2) 
full, true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS on each 
of the following by depositing copies in the United States mail, at St. George, 
Utah, postage pre-paid, addressed as follows: 
MICHAEL W. PARK 
THE PARK FIRM 
P.O. Box 2438 
St. George, Utah 84771-2438 
LASZLO ENDRODY. JR.. Pro Se 
Defendant/Respondent 
P.O. Box 1083 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-1083 
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ADDENDUM A: Memorandum Decision 
OURT 
IN THE _iSTRICT COURT • : ; 
iN HND FOR IRON - .UN'; 
CAROLYN MARIE ENDRODY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LASZLO ENDRODY, JR., ENDRODY 
TRUST, PATTY HEINZ, as Trustee 
of the ENDRODY TRUST, PATTY 
HEINZ, individually, ENDRODY 
TRUCKING, INC.. a Utah 
corporation. WILLIAM ENDRODY, 
LES D. ENDRODY, MICHAEL A. 
ENDRODY, LINDA S. M. ENDRODY, 
JONATHAN HEINZ, TERESA M. ENDR — 
DONNA ENDRODY, PAUL McGARVEY, 
MATILDA McGARVEY, MICKLOS ENDROD': 
MADELEIN L. ENDRODY, HEIDI 




'•• -rTCIAL DISTRICT 
MEMORANDUM 
DECISION 
Civil No, 914900027 
august 25, 
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This matter came ' nr^r^ * h- - r i - - • -,i 
1993. Jhe par t ies wei 
Michael M, • Garnet- • ,aszi: jnaror. ' r . . defendant, 
• -r,r-. .-.nrr,,-; ". v: rr * :" *nri "tie -!r* v ng , p r v e d i e f e n d a m 
\iiei?ei-i*.ci.i.t-.^;i ~. - e -„ >. *. 
Day. . u:" ..ear-i -viderice \nd •rgnment md - , a ^e
 (;aiit 
-*~--> 'ubmissirv e' -M^* *• -; v<< -^  - —lowing Jactr ar 
enters *... J : -„ . 
• defendant T:r-- -ar^—* j n the Panama Canal 
Zone n A^s:-- 1. . .• .... . member • : f bl I = I J S. 
military pr: ,.e ir.arrijiae JUIQ -xpeciea to make the mili tary 
« ( «' • 
her career. Defendant, a former sea captain, haa ' ^eL _ _ , -.- i 
as -i Panama Canal pilot since early LJ75. 
Two days before . - ^ .4^ aphu-s signed an 
"\ntemiDtiai Property Agreemen* The document was prepared by a 
I-.A- "ed by Mr. Endrody. xt was signed i n Panama. 
Pls:::tA:f *:eai i:'i- : "..at 'Vne signed the a . • - .> 
no n<=- lriaae 
at the time. 
owned 33,CO 
properTV ^n 







.ron . unt 
: at;: 
. ana.- ^uiic 
-^r . ; . -._ . MOW*- /"rr, oiit; 
to isign one agreement, tlere 
3,H nn "> awv^r re 
v
 * -' 'hat plaintiff 
. rupe r ^  .. ^ 4 me of l he 
wn-E- - * personal 
i the Snarody 
tti-, -. jLccountj. ana .-qui^ment . which is 
"Rreemeni: virtner ^-rcvides that the 
, .
 v . -^  Endrody 
.Rciujing accounts, .at-
 fc- ^ . ^ aachinery 
epar-^te property :-t tne iefendant, 
aue uxi tne ranch, 
nacr^utjrv ;^i-.-- ,.c marriage." A J. J 
u«^n : t [Toons . he :3fendant 3 home in the 
•r-t . ^ 4, - : * UJL t h e 
plaintiff. Plaii.Vff '-cimits that prior to the signing of the 
Agre^rv- r- "~~; visited *:he ^ancn in V n n • V,unty nnd !iad seen 
the cattle, ,; . ;ings, ii^iis. corr".iio niti jther .iiipi-^ vprnen f 
the property. She knew which property was being referenced in 
t "u^ reemi-Mi" 
The Endrody Ranch is a piec^ ^f r^M ^s^ _ 
Utah, comprised f \DOI:I MJ. ^ icre? ,:.; HI I .13 '..-sociated 
water . . ^ i_ "u v :.r • s r ~ .\ ;*? "\r naeea ::y 
defendant . uaroir J . . I-/"1 , M D C ^2 r; i . : 
these parties n^ i*..- * *_n<- Aanch ; 1^  tcrua. i . n * ne names of 
I,hi 'It. . *, however, it was the 
parents nonev wn_„:: W H P .fej % ,JK .- i'*l: . , down payment on 
the $Pr> '^" ' ; ^ " i ^ rri;e. Thereaft-.-r the parents paid the 
proper'1 . :nent 7 TV . ^ op^rtv was still being 
paid off at, * ne v .me 'Tie *. arties married. 
Priir -r ? * ' 1 I vi'c l he marri ;<e, ne iefenaanr :armed 
the lai •: . • h L i 1 . '* r * 'oent 
considerable money and ' imtj impr-v ^ ;ie proper i„. The 
defendant ^n^c=.r^n ~+r • . rento! -.gr^ -riu .* *;-n :iis parents which 
requii « J • *-* " ' The 
rent payments wet v aimosi auifieitm: . ^ c- ...e .iii.^ o. -ayments 
•IM t jame du & ^he i^r^r^r w^r^ -'eq; : rea • - -idd email .-urns to 
the . -*-- r>roc (-•-.- • . * riant 
3 
used large amounts of his earnings during the marriage to pay the 
rei 11 ci 1 11 ie E anch co i nsza 1 ] : mprovements such as sprinklers and 
corrals, and to clear and level additional acreage f :»:r 
cuL^iva^im. ~:e •!£:• \ c ^ n no -xchan^ed many items of farjn 
--^ ..r,./ : ' . l ~ *' ^ tge , often using his 
earnings :r\m he 1 anama 'an:. -__; _ an.-h t^ nay for the 
items. \\l "ne jr^ee^c -f * :V- ~an,-:; v;^ i *- *sed ~ z ..mprove it and 
to pay . i . - . - .^. . . . . it . 
In 2 J?5-4 - o - lefenaan: . ;s rust --, and his parents as 
trustors, e n t e r ^ • nx * .;?:rten t-MS' ^reement by which the 
Endrody Trus t vu y fo iIM, • .1 ' • 1; i*•* t, n i s t o r 43 •-' on^ -Feyed t he 11• i nterest 
ir. "he Endrody Ranch and Its water rights to the iefendant as 
: c-iiT""^ . "The Trust is an express,, voluntary., revocable inter 
vivos ~rust.* Each >J.1" 'The ^^ rotori:! ret "iineQ, 'luring :nc «ji" iior 
lifetime, the eights to revoke the Trust, The Trust had as 
--' ^~~ :or••, -- ,e"-r^: reirr^ rr r " h^ i \r-~ iv familv, . n_^ -din£ 
defendant . .- - , . . * E1-, .• .-: : Im-, 
was given h -err ::. numter : sharet 'h*- :a*:ii:ff j-ceived T4 
-
;
 --^ -- m ' ' ' 1efend*nv iorai ved * , -t'< . ir f -*ci oi ..,00 (J 
snares. .-.- : I HH 
shares out of a tota : ' * .-;nar^ s ssue JI ,-v T ne T ast. The 
P I ;n i nt;1 f f did not ob(j e -•*- - : r he ~ ~ rnr< * ; • n f * he "rust ^ t he 
transfer of the Ranch l"o i.he Trust, is lui i Imught 1 h a t t h e Rru'i d 
was the defendant's separate property. The plaintiff did not 
jo* "-"'Hion of the Trust, either as a grantor or as a 
trustee. 
The trust agreement trcvides "hat '.he -rustee may exercise 
broad p Dwers OT- ^e^ the r--t:t— --.- m uie Trust and may treat the 
property as though he were the owner thereof, subject to the 
discharge of his fiduciary tuties is 'rustee. The agreement 
: - ,'|"MP i d^p '"' '*: • -• * beneficiary who is a 
lineal descendant :i '..<_- *:u^t:. rs *.::. -n-iiw-ar" .10 is not a 
lineal ziescer. iair 1 \o • rustort*, "ne 2hai e~ t "ne non 
de:r - -,.-*^i • : . : : . • *^ .ted 
to the descendants 01 the iivorcea xup:-, per six^pes. 
Therefor. --r •: * :rne : 4riii *na -oo rdir^ • ne * eras jf the 
Tr - t - "  * * *- - 'ont 
to Michael J.UJ linaa inor i! .jr ? art: ^ ?enage .nii-xren, at 
the; L :::*-* *n:.- ~y^ T -nf^rei ~ r> * i f t r ^ ^ ^ o i:y- ? ~-e lecre^. 
wa s 
n e v e r " r a n s : > r r c j . i t o • - T r u s t , ^ l U ^ u ^ n i e f ^ n o a n t a s s u m e a t h a t 
n e ixad g i v e ^ .p : : z : ; i ter- i*sT \ e x e c u t i n g * h e Trus* A g r e e m e n t . 
A t +• . .1.-- *"!! • i n t . p r f t R t 
o u t s i d e ".ne r_rcv : 2 1 0 n s S.-L he T r u s t . ag reement . , 
A f t e r • r e - r e a t : : n : - h e T r u r r - t - d e f e n d a n t c o n t i n u e d t o 
maKe ..rr.;: r - -• -: 3 1 far in e q u i p m e n t , 
to supply the seed, labor and electrical power needs of the 
Ranch, to farm and raise livestock, and to pay rental payments to 
the Trust for the use of the land and water. The income 
generated by those activities was not the property of the Trust. 
The parties and the Trust filed separate tax returns, and for the 
years 1987 through 1990 those returns indicate that the farm was 
losing large amounts of money and the defendant was using his 
earnings from the Canal to pay many of the costs associated with 
running the Ranch and buying the equipment and supplies needed to 
do so. 
During the marriage, the defendant's annual income went from 
about $24,000 to over $120,000. The plaintiff did not work 
during the marriage outside the home. She was fully occupied 
with the duties of managing the family, caring for the children 
and keeping the home fires burning while the defendant was in 
Panama, often months at a time. The defendant sent all his 
earnings home to his father, who handled the defendant's banking. 
The father would see that the plaintiff was given enough money to 
feed and care for the family until the defendant came home on one 
of his long leaves. The defendant would then pay any outstanding 
bills and stock up the family cupboard before going back to 
Panama. During these leaves, the defendant spent considerable 
time working on the Ranch, both as his second job and as his 
6 
hobby. The defendant admits that he expected to inherit the 
Ranch upon the death of his parents prior to the creation of the 
trust. Since he has the majority of the shares issued in the 
Trust, he has treated the Ranch as his own property throughout 
the marriage and has spent a great deal of money and time on 
improvements to the property. As of April 17, 1992, the Ranch 
and improvements thereon, including sprinklers, wells, water 
distribution lines, buildings, two mobile homes, corrals and 
fences, were appraised as having a fair market value of $437,000. 
The Ranch is currently leased out to third parties who raise and 
harvest some hay for the Trust and pay the entire power bill on 
the premises, including that used to water Trust hay, in exchange 
for the use of the property. The defendant no longer acts as 
manager of the Ranch, and has resigned as trustee of the Trust 
and his daughter by prior marriage has been properly appointed as 
•trustee. Since defendant is still the majority shareholder in 
the Trust and his daughter is the current trustee, the court is 
convinced that the defendant could resume the position of trustee 
at will. 
The farm machinery and equipment being used or located on 
the Ranch has been bought by defendant from his earnings during 
the marriage, except for the 150 hp JD 4630 tractor, the JD 3960 
Harvester, the offset disc bought in 1970, the flatbed trailer 
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turned over to Endrody Trucking and the horse trailer belonging 
to Linda. Defendant testified that he had traded in machinery he 
owned prior to the marriage which was separate property and 
covered by the premarital agreement but the evidence thereon is 
speculative and unconvincing. The defendant was unable to supply 
specific incidents or evidence as to values of the alleged 
separate property and any separate character of that property is 
untraceable and has been obliterated by commingling, augmentation 
and improvement using marital funds and assets. It is 
undisputed, and clearly established by the evidence, that the 
defendant's earnings during the marriage from the farm and from 
the Panama Canal employment are marital property. 
During the marriage the defendant was acquiring retirement 
benefits from his employment with the Panama Canal Commission. 
Those benefits began to accrue prior to the marriage. The 
parties have agreed that the Court should promulgate a qualified 
domestic relations order to be forwarded to the Commission so 
that a proper calculation can be done as to how much of the 
benefit was accrued during the marriage. Plaintiff is entitled 
to one half of that benefit accrued during the marriage. 
Defendant has now retired from the Panama Canal and currently 
receives a monthly benefit of $2442 per month. 
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During the marriage the parties or the Trust acquired 
additional properties which present issues in this case. In 
1982, the parties bought a home in Cedar City which they paid for 
with marital funds. The title to the home was taken by the 
plaintiff and the defendant as trustees for the two minor 
children of the parties, Michael and Linda. After the Trust was 
created, the Cedar City house was transferred into the Trust, 
with the agreement of both -che plaintiff and the defendant. 
Plaintiff received 70 additional shares in the Trust upon her 
agreement to transfer the Cedar City house to the Trust. 
Thereafter, the parties paid rent to the Trust for the use of the 
house. The defendant has occupied this home during these 
proceedings and is being assessed rent by the Trust. 
During the marriage the defendant bought 5 acres of land in 
Enoch City which was paid for with Trust funds and deeded to the 
defendant as trustee for the Trust. 
During the marriage the defendant bought a home in Enoch 
City, in which plaintiff has resided by order of the court during 
the pendency of these proceedings. That home was paid for by 
Trust funds and title was taken by defendant as trustee for the 
Trust. During the time the parties resided in that home, they 
paid rent to the trust for the use of the premises. Patty Heinz, 
the current trustee of the Trust, has testified that once this 
9 
4 C Q 
divorce case is decided, the Trust will seek the ouster of the 
plaintiff from the Enoch home and will hold defendant responsible 
for all losses the Trust has suffered during the time the 
plaintiff has occupied the home without paying the required rent 
The 1969 mobile home located on the Ranch is a marital 
asset, it having been purchased during the marriage by the 
parties and paid for with marital funds. The larger mobile home 
located on the Ranch, and occupied by defendant's mother, is not 
the property of the parties, but belongs to Matilda Endrody. 
During the marriage the Trust bought a home on Blue Sky 
Drive in Enoch City which was paid for with Trust funds and for 
the use of which the Trust collected rent. That home has been 
sold be the Trust, through Patty Heinz as trustee, during the 
pendency of these proceedings to reduce the debt of the Trust. 
Plaintiff is currently enrolled in college and working 
toward a secretarial degree. She hopes to be able to enter the 
work force after that in a secretarial or office manager type 
job. Plaintiff suffers from several illnesses and takes various 
medications which limit the types of work she can do. She last 
worked just prior to this marriage. Her degree will require at 
least 2 years to complete. 
Defendant also hopes to return to the work force following 
the resolution of this case, although he will not be able to 
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return ^o the Panama Canal because of his physical condition. He 
hopes to find employment in the merchant marine as a master or 
mate. However, he is currently caring for and has temporary 
custody of the two teenage children of the parties. Michael is 
quite ill and requires constant care. Child care would create 
problems if he were to go back to sea as that line of work 
requires lengthy absences. Plainriff has indicated that she is 
not interested in taking physical custody of the children at this 
time but would do so if anything happened to the defendant. The 
parties have agreed that the court should award joint custody to 
them, with physical custody to the defendant and reasonable 
rights of visitation to the plaintiff. 
During the marriage the defendant set up a corporation known 
as Endrody Trucking. The initial contribution to that company 
and several later contributions were made from marital assets. 
The court finds that the stock or other interest in that 
corporation held by either of the parties is marital property. 
The parties acquired two pick up trucks and one Cadillac 
during the marriage. The parties have stipulated that the 
Cadillac is the plaintiff's separate property and the two pick up 
trucks belong to the Trust. The 1978 Chrysler Cordoba automobile 
is a marital asset having a value of $300. 
At time of trial the parties own no cattle in their own 
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name. At the time the case was filed, the parties owned a large 
herd of cattle. During the pendency of "chese proceedings the 
defendant has sold those cattle in violation of the court's 
restraining order. The defendant was found in contempt by the 
court following a hearing held December 14, 1992. The penalty 
determination was stayed, as the court wanted the advantage of 
hearing all the evidence before deciding on the appropriate 
penalty for the sale of the cattle. 
During the trial, plaintiff's evidence showed that she had 
incurred attorney fees in the total amount of $35,602.25 and 
costs in the total amount of $1431.50. The defendant presented 
no evidence on his attorney fees, nor did he present evidence 
regarding the reasonableness of the fees and costs incurred by 
plaintiff. 
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT 
Plaintiff contends that the premarital agreement entered 
into by the parties should be invalidated because she signed it 
under coercion and without full disclosure. The courts of this 
State have clearly held that antenuptial agreements are valid and 
enforceable with certain exceptions. Such agreements are 
validated if the evidence demonstrates that the agreement was 
entered into voluntarily without coercion or fraud, and if there 
was material disclosure of assets. [See Nielsen v. Nielsen, 780 
12 
47 1 
P.2d 1264; Hunk v. Huck, 734 p. 2d 417; Berman v. 3erman, 749 
P.2d 1271.] 
The evidence in this case demonstrates no coercion, fraud or 
involuntariness. Plaintiff testified that prior to the signing 
of the agreement she was aware of the Ranch and its improvements, 
having visited there herself. The question of a premarital 
agreement came up for the first time in Panama just before the 
marriage was to take place but the plaintiff testified there were 
no threats, no ultimatum, no duress or coercion. She assumed 
that there would be no marriage if she refused to sign the 
agreement but the defendant made no such statement or indication. 
Further, plaintiff had no objection to signing the agreement as 
she assumed that the Ranch would be the separate property of the 
defendant after the marriage, just as her belongings would 
continue to be hers after the marriage. The burden of proving 
the existence of coercion is born by the plaintiff and she has 
failed to carry that burden in this case. 
The evidence in this case does demonstrate material non-
disclosure, however. The plaintiff argues that the non-
disclosure consists of the overvaluation of the Ranch, its 
cattle, its accounts and equipment. The defendant admits that 
the figure of $600,000 was not accurate at the time of the 





that amount. The court holds, however, that an error of that 
type does not constitute material non-disclosure. 
The plaintiff was familiar with the property included in the 
agreement. There was no confusion, nor was she misled, by the 
overvaluation of that property. She agreed that the defendant 
could keep the described property as his separate property even 
at the value he gave it. The purpose of the requirement of full, 
material disclosure is to provide the agreeing party a full 
opportunity to assess what he or she is giving up by signing the 
agreement. Obviously if the property is greatly undervalued 
during disclosure the other party has been deprived of the 
ability to properly determine what is being given up. However, 
when the value of the property has been overstated, and the 
agreeing party decides to sign anyway, he or she has had adequate 
disclosure to make a reasoned decision. The law does not require 
absolute accuracy in disclosure. The overvaluation of the Ranch 
was not material non-disclosure as the court can presume that if 
the true value of the property had been disclosed, being less 
than the amount stated, the plaintiff would have entered into the 
agreement all the more readily, as she would have been giving up 
less than she chose to give up in this agreement. 
The court finds, however, that the agreement executed by 
these parties did not make the required material disclosure as to 
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that portion of the document which provided: 
"The parties intend and desire that ail real and personal 
property on the Endrody Ranch in Iron County, including 
accounts, cattle and machinery shall remain the separate 
property of the prospective husband, LASZLO ENDRODY, JR., 
regardless of any loans or payments made on the ranch, 
accounts, cattle, or machinery during the marriage." 
No where in the agreement is there any indication of the 
nature of the indebtedness on the Ranch or other assets or the 
nature of any accounts it may hold or owe. In this case the 
evidence is persuasive that throughout this marriage the 
defendant was using large amounts of his earnings, which were 
clearly marital funds, to improve the Ranch, to buy cattle and 
machinery and to supply the farming needs of the Ranch 
enterprise. The effect of this arrangement is that the Ranch is 
now an asset which has escalated in value from $80,000 at the 
time of its purchase prior to the marriage to $437,000 at the 
last appraisal. The defendant has effectively provided himself a 
way to transform marital earnings into his separate property, at 
will, be simply using the money in connection with the Ranch. 
The agreement does not reveal that such was the contemplation of 
the parties. Nor is there any evidence that the plaintiff ever 
knew of or agreed to such an outcome. Failure of the defendant 
to reveal that he intended to make significant improvements to 
his separate property from marital assets and then to claim the 
improvements as his own separate property constituted material 
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non-disciosure. 
In addition, the enforcement of the above quoted portion of 
the agreement would be substantially unfair under the 
circumstances in this case. Antenuptial agreements, or son\e 
portion thereof, may be invalidated because of unfairness. [See 
Nieison v. Nielsen-, and Berman v, Berman. cited above.] During 
the marriage the defendant earned well over $100,000 per year for 
several years from his employment. The evidence shows that much 
of that money was spent improving the Ranch and its assets, which 
the defendant expected individually to inherit,, own or control 
upon the death of his parents. Were the court to enforce this 
provision of the agreement, it would result in an unfair result 
since the controlling interest in the Ranch is now held by a 
Trust controlled largely by the defendant. If the machinery and 
other personal property on the Ranch, including its accounts, 
cattle, and machinery were also to be held the separate property 
of the defendant, the plaintiff would walk away from 17 years of 
marriage with precious little and the defendant would have 
amassed a considerable fortune using marital funds. Such a 
result is not fair and was not within the contemplation of the 
parties at the time of the agreement. 
Accordingly, the court holds that the provisions of the 
Antenuptial Property Agreement according separate property status 
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to personal property on the Ranch, including accounts, cattle, 
and machinery regardless of any loans or payments made thereon 
during the marriage is unenforceable. Further the court holds 
that any improvements to real property of the Ranch during tlc\e 
marriage which were paid for with marital funds are not made 
defendant's separate property by the agreement for the reasons 
cited above. 
The court must next consider whether this holding 
invalidates the entire premarital agreement. The Utah Supreme 
Court has held, in Nielson v. Nielson, : 
"Where the offending provision [of an antenuptial 
agreement] is separable from the rest of the contract, the 
non-offending provisions are enforceable." 
The court finds that the offending provision in the 
agreement at hand is separable from the remaining portions of the 
agreement. Therefore, the agreement is declared valid and 
enforceable except as to the offending provisions identified 
above. 
In applying the agreement to the facts in this case, the 
defendant's interest in the real property which constituted the 
Ranch at the time of the marriage would be the separate property 
of the defendant, as would any increase in value of that property 
attributable solely to the independent forces of the market place 
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and the economy, including inflationary factors1. [See 24 Am. 
Jur. 2d Section 891, p. 372; Dunn v. Dunn, 802 p.2d 1314, 1320 
(Utah 1990); Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1168 (Utah 1990)] 
However, any increase in value attributable to the expenditure of 
marital funds on repairs, improvements, new acquisitions or the 
like is a marital asset subject to division by this court. (See 
24 Am. Jur. 2d, Sect-ion 892; Burt v. Burt., cited above; Dunn v. 
Dunn, cited above.; Likewise, any interest in personal property 
held by defendant at the time of the marriage and which was 
maintained separate and paid for without the application of 
marital funds, would remain the separate property of the 
defendant. However, any interest in an item of personal property 
acquired after the marriage and paid for by marital funds would 
1In Dunn v. Dunn, page 1320, the Court of Appeals held: 
"The general rule is that equity requires that each 
party retain the separate property he or she brought into the 
marriage, including any appreciation of the separate property. 
(Citations omitted) Exceptions to this general rule include 
whether the property has been commingled, whether the other 
spouse has by his or her efforts augmented, maintained, or 
protected the separate property, and whether the distribution 
achieves a fair, just, and equitable result." 
It is clear from the evidence in this case that plaintiff 
has augmented and maintained the property of the defendant by his 
use of marital funds to improve his separate property. In 
addition, this court finds unfair and inequitable a property 
distribution that would leave the defendant with the principle 
assets of the marriage and all the value they have accrued 
because he used marital funds to increase that value during the 
marriage, even though one half of those funds must be attributed 
to the efforts of the plaintiff. 
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be a marital asset, subject to division by the court. 
THE ENDRQDY TRUST 
Much of the litigation in this case has been caused by the 
creation of the Endrody Trust by defendant and his parents op 
October 5, 1984. At the time of the signing of the Trust 
Agreement, the defendant's parents, as trustors, held title to 
2/3 undivided interest in the Ranch. Their interest was 
transferred to the Trust. The remaining 1/3 undivided interest 
was held by defendant. That interest was never deeded to the 
Trust. Plaintiff now attacks the Trust and has even joined the 
Trust, its trustee, and some of its current beneficiaries as 
defendants in this lawsuit. The plaintiff has been unable to 
direct the court to any authority which would allow this court to 
invalidate or set aside the Trust under the circumstances of this 
case. 
The plaintiff's primary complaint is that the defendant has 
placed marital assets in the Trust. Even if such is the case, it 
is no basis for setting aside a Trust created by third party 
trustors for the benefit of the parties, as well as other 
beneficiaries unrelated to this divorce action. A court cannot 
invade a trust established for a lawful purpose where there is no 
showing that the trust was created by fraud, duress, undue 
influence, or mistake, unless all parties in interest consent 
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properly to the revocation. (See 76 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 101, P. 
138) The court is required to give effect to the intent of the 
trustors who created the trust, absent, j/ueh \ hnwiug. 
Plaint, iff has also pointed to some actions by the defendant 
'••• - ** rustee as grounds for setting aside the trust. 
7ht^ general . . s ^ha^ a trust does not terminate merely 
because of •ne isconau.r of the trustee, his neglect or 
inabil i ty - • - 'h : natter iti on to it. (See 75 Am. 
Jur. 2d, Section 106, p. 141.) 
In short the plaintiff has failed to carry her uraen to 
ivihuw Mj.il.. Ui • "'""YiLtt, .'.huuld I. ;; ,i.ei; .* • - <,_ . *
 e 
court to adopt the a l t e r ego doctrine from \he law of 
corporations and to apply i t In th . s i tua t ion. "The court 
iet.' i J ii'•*..' M M
 k i i i o w e v p p , f V ^ n i I I In1. m i l I vi-rt ( u <if> JM , the 
plaintiff jould not prevail. This Trust is jbvLously not the 
liter ego - t" 1 he defendant, even though, he enjoyed broad powers 
i,c< i rut'II^1 urn i - * * * - e 
demonstrates that the Trust .VJIU^-J .-..^ i-ei* . i tn* . cities 
which was managed '-v defendant for the enefi' ; • ;e 'ruse and 
i i\ bene! i c i fi i'i < ' - "•-' "~r 
the jse ot Fru. proper* ie^ iami * -v-_ aaai, • : tnat 3r;e 
consented to the contribution of the Cedar ritv house 
"L'ruai ..-lie .igret .:! l.u i-ake itharet. 1 ' <-r 
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whatever interest she might have in that house. The Trust was 
treated by all concerned as a separate legal entity, the proper 
forms were observed, and the defendai i t was i 11 ider a coi i tir ining 
duty as trustee to perform properly his fiduciary duties. The 
defendant bought and sold and financed and paid for property as 
trustee of the trust and there is no showing that he commingled 
the affairs of the Trust and his personal, affairs. 
m
 * -*->--: t h e c o i i r t 1 i o ] d s t h a t t h €^  T r u s t i s a ^ ? a J i d i n t e r 
vivos trust and that, the claims of the plain tiff against the 
Trust, its beneficiaries, and its trustee are unsupported. Those 
c 1 a i in s a r e h e r e b ;y o i d e r e d d i s in i s s e d. A c c o r d i n g 1 j 11: : * • - / 
held by the Trust, including the 2/ "3 interest in the Ran-:..,,, the 
Cedar City house, the 5 acres i n Enoch, the Enoch house, and the 
, ' - . • . . . . . • -t= — - - . . . _ - • " : r 
dis^ric Jt: -: etween these „brt:e^ -^  .aritai assess _;£ : nose 
items * T o p e n y ^eiong zo d :hira parity. (See ^4
 4ia±. J^i . «d, 
oectiun MWti. ) 
However, the court also holds that the shares in the Trust 
held by the defendant as beneficiary are marita] property in view 
:)f the fac t ti: ia t defendai i t acqi :i :i i • 3d those shar< - ' ".e 
marriage, 1 las increased the value of those shares during the 
marriage by the i ise of marital, funds and the application of large 
amo u n t s ~: .. • a i i d ~ \ • o t h e i • w i s e b e J o n g i n g t : 11 i e n i a i: i i a g e, 
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Rind has r^ t^ rr.^ d all earnings from The ^Qr°h ^^ "•"he ^ anoh and the 
^r^". to ~ ..T ^xclusicn of plaintiff ,e M t .ererjv : iers 
. .
 ;- , - w < . .-,- - y 
# « 
m m i'UDjeci w - .cnsiructive *jtULit imposec . y Mile rjurt. He is 
to hold only title to those shares in trust for the plaintiff and 
s i: i e i s • :± w a. i d e d 1I 1 e f i i ] 1 b e i i e f i t a i: i :i < i s e o f 11 I o s e s h a i " e s , 
including voting rights and the right to any property 
distribution attributable to those -n.ar<:^. 
REEL . n — . . _ . „ . _ : 
Inherent in plain-: ff .• position -• the claim that the 
payments of rent which tne parties made uu one Trust for the use 
of In ist property were somehow 3 improper and constituted 
impermissible augment at- ::. i the Tvuz- -;i: h marital property-
'.-.: " : * ould have trie uourb * • < lefendai it a i: i :i i :I le 
Trust . !jLj,r ... . - r o r ^ h^s ^e^ceived .:.: vr: /ty. The evidence 
has ' c n v m c e d this court that the rental agreements were 
1 egitimate bargains between the parbo.ee and t'-.r- T n is t, -n 
though defendant acted on both ptidep <->f .. transactions. i n 
each instance the parties were -^ranto-* • leasehold interest in 
tl: le property j n iiiest ion, ue n a U U U B - . Ranch , The 
parties actually paid the rent and were \e,,; .^sponsible by the 
Trust for those payments. The -. :;ur+ fii.ds tuat -he* plaintiff has 
fai led t : ! 3: rove i :,ha t i ::.he r • • - -- t they 
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were not given in exchange for a return benefit of comparable 
v a 11 1 e wh i c h b : 11 I i ; a r t i e s e n j o y e d I n e s s e n c e , 1: h e T ri i s t >/ a s i :i i 
the same position as any other landlord vis-a-vis these parties. 
ENPRODY TRUCKING CORPORATION 
P1 a i n t :i f f"" s s e c o n d ame n d e d c o m.p 1 a i n t a 1 ] e g e s t h a" * "l " *' 4 ; 4 j 
known as Endrody Trucking (hereinafter "Corp.") ^ uarioal 
property. The plaintiff does not allege that • h - or^craie veil 
s 1 Io 111 d ! : e Piei ced or that the a 11ei " • e 
applied I i ' ni- "\ae . Jertsir.lv " ner nas oeen .o *v.aence 
presented w» : : ; ; u s t i f y "ur1- i o r i r - • -.: s ^ :u r 1 the 
:)tl: le i I: iai: : . - . * . . y 
interest (t fc r.e i *n " ies r -aock : .i f nai "ori whether acqu ired 
i n t h e nan *"• * * * ie t^rdarv . * ' h e ^ l a v ^ i f f . must bQ " ^ e a t e d a s 
m a r i t a l p r o p e i • to I iav:i i ig been acqi l i i e :i wj t l i niai :i t a ] fi m d s . 
RETIREMENT 
The part ies have st ipulated that the part ies are ent itled to 
a prop* vi'1" tvi 31 1a t s shaz e :: f tl: i€ • i : e t:i 1: emer 1 t I *n- : tl: 1a t the 
defendant now receives from the Panama Canal Commission. Some of 
uhr- l enefit relates to the period before the parti es were 
m&: I ::i 1 1 to f f :i s 51 1 t:i t,3 ed t ::> 1! 2 tl: i€ • 1: ^ enef I t 
attributable to the period beginning with the marriage of the 
parties and ending wi fh the defendant s effective retirement 
date . 1 1 a:i 1 1 t if f s co in 1 se 1 i _• _ * a qua 1 if ied domes t ic 
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relations order for signature by the court and to make the 
necessary arrangements with the Commission 30 that the 
plaintiff's entitlement cai 1 be pi 'o^eriv 1. ^ated ;nd
 L..-aid 
directly to her. 
In accordance ^ltr. ' nc- ..t;;/a:^iion o: ne parties, the 
parties are hereby awarded ,oir;t custody jf "ne two minor 
chii drei 1 of bl: ie ma r^iage . : • ' r'-'-- - . -• >-* def endai 1 c 
and reasonable rights of vi s i c a t i _ n f . * ;,e _-x.a ..A* 1: : * 
The issue of .biild .:uppjrt . o -ese* ,Ted a;i ii "he court has 
entere :i 2 ts fi na ] . - )t d :i * n sion 
as detailed hereafter. 
PROPERTY DIVISION 
property o>* r^n^r^v 
.1 
.rem ii separate 
- -ij ' - -:rj'^ v. The 
z 
i t e n u p i i i i igreemei:1" ne lb ;^i, the 
Applying those rulings to the evidence 
determj 1 les tha t the fob 1 ow:i ng :i terns 
.v parties: 
PLAINTIFF'S SEPARATE PROPERTY: 








except that belonging to Linda Endrody, 
2. The Cadillac automobile, and 
3. All personal items of property identifiable as being 
owned by plaintiff prior to the marriage. 
(The parties stipulated during the trial that the Cadillac and 
the furnishings in the Enoch house could be so treated.) 
DEFENDANT'S SEPARATE PROPERTY: 
1. A 1/3 undivided interest in the Ranch except for any 
increase in value attributable to use of marital funds, 
2. Any equipment, machinery or other personal property 
owned prior to the marriage and used on the Ranch, and 
3. Any equipment, machinery or other personal property 
in which the defendant held an interest at the time of the 
marriage except for any value attributable to the expenditure of 
marital funds. 
The following are items of marital property which should be 
divided equally and fairly between the parties. 
MARITAL PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES: 
1. Any value of the defendant's 1/3 interest in the 
Ranch attributable to the use of marital funds or assets. 
2. Any farm machinery, equipment or other personal 
property acquired during the marriage. 
3. Any holdings, stock or other interest in the Corp., 
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4. The identified retirement benefit, 
5. Any other vehicles, furnishings, cash, earnings, or 
property not specifically discussed above which were acquired by 
either party during the marriage, 
6. The shares held by defendant in the Trust, the court 
having ordered that 1/2 of the shares in the Trust which are held 
in the name of the defendant as of the time of trial are subject 
to a constructive trust and are held by defendant for the use and 
benefit of plaintiff, 
7. Any tax refunds attributable to any part of the 
period of the marriage, 
8. Any mobile home or trailer acquired during the 
marriage by the parties, except the horse trailer belonging to 
Linda Endrody, 
The court having now determined the law to be applied 
in this case and having entered certain orders herein as to how 
various items of property are to be treated, it now seems 
appropriate to set this matter for further argument or the 
presentation of evidence on the following matters: 
1. The values to be fixed for the various property 
interests identified above for separate and marital property. 
2. The value of the debts and obligations of the 
parties, and whether outstanding debts are chargeable as marital 
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obligations or individual obligations. 
3. The proper division of marital property between 
these parties. 
4. Determination of a proper alimony award after 
property and debts have been valued and divided. 
5. Determination of a proper child support assessment 
after property and debts have been valued and divided. 
6. Determination regarding the assessment of attorney 
fees, after the property and debts have been valued and divided. 
7. Any remaining unresolved issues. 
Accordingly, this matter is ordered set on the Law and 
Motion Calendar on October 4, 1993, at 9:00 AM, in the Iron 
County Courthouse in Parowan, Utah for review and scheduling as 
may become necessary. The plaintiff and defendant are ordered to 
be present at the above time and place along with their counsel. 
The trust defendants need not attend, but may do so if they 
choose, in person apd/or by counsel. 
<?&£,•£, r&<s&a-* 
Phi l ip E f^es 
i s t r i c t Junge 
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Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that on this day of September, 
1993, I mailed true and correct copies of the above and foregoing 
MEMORANDUM DECISION, first class postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
James M. Park, Esq. Laszlo Endrody, Jr. 
P. 0. Box 765 P. 0. Box 1083 
Cedar City, UT 34721-0765 Cedar City, UT 84721-1083 
Michael A. Day, Esq. 
90 East 200 North 
P. 0. Box 400 
St. George, UT 84770 
Omt^ Jru^^ 
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ADDENDUM B: Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(excluding Exhibit A) 
MICHAEL A. DAY - A5463 
SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM, DRAKE, 
WADE & SMART 
A Professional Corporation 
90 East 200 North 
P.O. Box 400 
St. George, Utah 84771-0400 
801/628-1611 
File #737501/wp8 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN MARIE ENDRODY, 
| FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, | CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
LAZSLO ENDRODY, JR., ENDRODY 
TRUST, PATTY HEINZ, as Trustee of the 
ENDRODY TRUST, PATTY HEINZ, 
individually, ENDRODY TRUCKING, INC. 
a Utah corporation, WILLIAM ENDRODY, 
LES D. ENDRODY, MICHAEL A. 
ENDRODY, LINDA S.M. ENDRODY, 
JONATHAN HEINZ, TERESA M. 
ENDRODY, DONNA ENDRODY, PAUL 
McGARVEY, MATILDA McGARVEY, 
MICKLOS ENDRODY, MADELEIN L 
ENDRODY, and LUKE JAMES 
ENDRODY, 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on the 29th day of 
November, 1993, before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, District Court Judge. Plaintiff 
was present with her counsel of record, James F. Park of the Park Firm; Defendant 
Lazslo Endrody, Jr., (the "Defendant") was present and represented himself; and the 
remaining defendants (the "Trust Defendants") were represented by their counsel of 
QM>-
Civil No. 914900027 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
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record, Michael A. Day of Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom, Drake, Wade & Smart. The Court 
previously entered a Memorandum Decision, on September 21, 1993, which left open 
certain issues to be addressed at the November 29, 1993, hearing. The Court, after 
hearing additional evidence, and being fully advised in the premises, now enters the 
following Findings of Fact. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that its Memorandum decision, filed on September 21, 
1993, should be incorporated into these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
said Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein 
by this reference. 
2. The Court finds that it is clear and unambiguous that the Defendant 
transferred his one-third interest in the ranch property to the Endrody Trust on or about 
October 9, 1984, upon which transfer of all of the reanch property had been conveyed 
to the Endrody Trust. The provisions of the Court's Memorandum Decision indicating 
that the Defendant had retained a one-third undivided interest in the ranch property, or 
that only two-thirds of the ranch property was conveyed to and held by the Endrody 
Trust, should be amended and modified to incorporate this finding. 
3. With respect to the Plaintiff's claims against the Endrody Trust, the Court 
finds that the Endrody Trust is a valid inter vivos trust, that the claims of the Plaintiff 
against the Trust, its beneficiary and its trustees are unsupported and should be 
dismissed, and that the property held by Endrody Trust, including the ranch property, 
the Cedar City home, the 5 acres in Enoch, the Enoch home, and the personal 
property belonging to the Endrody Trust are not marital assets and are not available 
for distribution between Plaintiff and the Defendant, but are items of property 
belonging to the Endrody Trust. 
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4. The Court finds that the following items of farm equipment are marital 
assets and should be awarded to the Plaintiff. The Court finds that these items of farm 
equipment were acquired during the period of the marriage: 
Equipment Value 
a. Cultivator $150.00 
b. Snapper Lawnmower $75.00 
c. JD Lawnmower $400.00 
d. Heston Swather $5,500.00 
e. Double rake $75.00 
f. Wire baler $5,000.00 
g. Corn planter $500.00 
h. Leveler $2,500.00 
i. JD 2750 Tractor $13,000.00 
j . JD 3 bottom plow $1,500.00 
Total value of farm equipment awarded to Plaintiff: $29,325.00 
5. The Court finds that the following items of farm equipment are marital 
assets and should be awarded to the Defendant. The Court finds that these items of 
farm equipment were acquired during the period of the marriage: 
Equipment 
a. Hoe and Bale Wagon 
b. Hay loader 





$26,500.00 Total value of farm equipment awarded to Defendant: 
The Court also finds that the Defendant should be awarded, as his separate 
property, other items of farm equipment, currently held by Defendant, which were 
acquired by the Defendant prior to the parties' marriage. 
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6. The Court finds that various cattle were acquired and sold during the 
period of the parties' marriage, but that all cattle have been sold and no division of 
cattle is necessary. 
7. The Court finds that the parties have acquired 6,000 shares of stock in 
Endrody Trucking, Inc., during the period of the marriage; that said shares should be 
treated as marital property; and that it is fair and equitable that the Plaintiff receive 
3,000 shares and the Defendant receive 3,000 shares. 
8. The debts acquired by the parties during the period of their marriage, 
including any periods of separation, should be assumed and satisfied as follows, 
except as otherwise provided herein: 
a. Plaintiff should be responsible for satisfying any debts incurred by 
her during the period of the parties' marriage and incurred during the parties' 
separation; 
b. Defendant should be responsible for satisfying any debts incurred 
by him during the period of the parties' marriage and incurred during the parties' 
separation; and 
c. The Defendant should be responsible for satisfying any debt owed 
to Mark McKim. 
9. The Court finds that the Defendant should be awarded the care, custody 
and control of the parties' minor children, Michael A. Endrody and Linda S. M. Endrody 
and that Plaintiff should be entitled to reasonable rights of visitation with said children. 
10. The Court finds that the Plaintiff should pay to the Defendant, as and for 
child support for the parties' minor children, $177.00 per month, which amount is 
consistent with Utah's Uniform Child Support Guidelines. The Court further finds that 
any modification of child support should be based upon, and consistent with, Utah's 
Child Support Guidelines. Said child support payments should continue until each 
child reaches the age of eighteen (18), with the Court reserving jurisdiction to continue 
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child support obligations in the event that either of the parties' minor children has 
special needs which warrant a continuation of child support. 
11. The Court finds that each party should be required to keep and maintain 
medical and dental insurance for the benefit of the minor children, when it is available 
to them at a reasonable cost or through their respective employment. Each party 
should be required to pay one-half of all medical and dental expenses incurred by the 
parties' minor children which are not covered by health or dental insurance. 
12. The Court finds that the Defendant should prepare and submit 
documentation of insurance records and medical and dental bills to the Plaintiff, and 
that the Plaintiff should be required to reimburse the Defendant for one-half of those 
expenses if there are medical or dental expenses which are not covered by then 
existing insurance. The obligation to maintain insurance on the parties' children and 
to pay those medical and dental expenses not covered by insurance, should end as 
each child reaches the age of majority. 
13. The Court finds that rent was incurred by the Plaintiff, due to her 
occupation and possession of the Enoch home, belonging to the Endrody Trust, at the 
rate of $850.00 per month over a 24 month period, for a total rent due and owing to the 
Endrody Trust of $20,400.00. The Court finds that the Plaintiff should be responsible 
to pay and satisfy one-half of this rent amount, being $10,200.00, and that the 
Defendant should be responsible to pay and satisfy the remaining one-half of said rent 
amount being $10,200.00. 
14. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to receive alimony from the 
Defendant in the amount of $300.00 per month, beginning with the month of 
December, 1993. Alimony should terminate upon the death, remarriage or 
cohabitation of the Plaintiff or upon further Order of the Court. This alimony award is 
based upon the Court's finding that the Plaintiff is in need of alimony and that the 
Defendant has the ability to pay a reasonable sum for alimony, and the Court finds 
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that, based upon the respective circumstances of the parties, $300.00 per month is a 
reasonable sum for alimony. 
15. The Court finds that the Plaintiff's evidence at trial showed that she had 
incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $35,602.25, with costs in the total amount of 
$1,431.50. The Defendant should be required to pay to Plaintiff, as and for attorney's 
fees, the sum of $15,000.00, which amount includes $5,000.00 previously paid by the 
Defendant toward Plaintiffs attorney's fees. Therefore, Defendant is left owing the 
balance of $10,000.00 to Plaintiff for her attorney's fees. 
16. The Court finds that the Defendant was previously found in contempt of 
Court and that the Defendant should pay $810.00 to the Plaintiff for said contempt, 
which amount will reimburse Plaintiff for the attorney's fees and costs reasonably 
incurred by Plaintiff as a result of Defendant's contempt. 
17. The Court finds that the 1,101 shares held by Defendant in the Endrody 
Trust are marital assets and should be equally divided between the parties; that 550 
1/2 shares should be awarded to Plaintiff and should be held in constructive trust by 
the Defendant, under which the Defendant should continue to hold title to said shares 
and Plaintiff should be awarded full use and benefit of said shares, including voting 
and distribution rights. The Court further finds that if the Trust makes any distribution, 
in any form, to its shareholders, then that portion of said distribution associated with 
Plaintiff's beneficial interest in 550 1/2 shares should be held by Defendant, in trust for 
Plaintiff, and Plaintiff should be offered her portion of any distribution to shareholders 
before any other application of the funds, including reinvestment. 
18. The Court finds that the Defendant owes a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, in 
connection with the above-referenced constructive trust, and that Defendant should 
forward to Plaintiff any notices or information disseminated by the trust to Defendant, 
regarding trust meetings or other activities which might affect Plaintiff's beneficial 
interest in the trust shares or her rights with respect thereto. 
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19. The Court finds that the parties have stipulated that Plaintiff is entitled to 
one-half of all retirement benefits accumulated by Defendant from the date of the 
parties marriage, being the 11th day of April, 1975, until the Defendant retired on or 
about December 14, 1991. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to one-
half of the retirement benefits accumulated by Defendant during that period of time. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court, having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, concludes that the 
foregoing findings constitute a complete and final determination of the Court relating to 
issues of the case of Endrodv v. Endrody. Iron County Civil No. 914900027, and that a 
Decree and Judgment should be madejand entered jn accordance therewith. 
DATED this ^ day of 
Approved as to Form and Content 
District Court Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the .Tys^day of July, 1994, I served a copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW on each of the 
following by depositing a copy in the U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid, addressed to: 
James M. Park, Esq. 
THE PARK FIRM 
965 South Main, #3 
P. 0. Box 765 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Laszlo Endrody, Jr. 
P.O. Box 1083 
Cedar City, Utah 84720-1083 
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ADDENDUM C: Decree and Judgment 
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SNOW, NUFFER, ENGSTROM, DRAKE, 
WADE & SMART 
A Professional Corporation 
90 East 200 North 
P.O. Box 400 
St. George, Utah 84771-0400 
801/628-1611 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN MARIE ENDRODY, 
i JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAZSLO ENDRODY, JR., ENDRODY 
TRUST, PATTY HEINZ, as Trustee of the 
ENDRODY TRUST, PATTY HEINZ, 
individually, ENDRODY TRUCKING, INC., 
a Utah corporation, WILLIAM ENDRODY, 
LES D. ENDRODY, MICHAEL A. 
ENDRODY, LINDA S.M. ENDRODY, 
JONATHAN HEINZ, TERESA M. 
ENDRODY, DONNA ENDRODY, PAUL 
McGARVEY, MATILDA McGARVEY, 
MICKLOS ENDRODY, MADELEIN L. 
ENDRODY, and LUKE JAMES 
ENDRODY, 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on the 29th day of 
November, 1993, before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, District Court Judge. Plaintiff 
was present with her counsel of record, James F. Park of the Park Firm; Defendant 
Lazslo Endrody, Jr., (the "Defendant") was present and represented himself; and the 
remaining defendants (the "Trust Defendants") were represented by their counsel of 
record, Michael A. Day of Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom, Drake, Wade & Smart. After trial of 
4> 
Civil No. 914900027 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
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the matter on August 25, 26 and 27, 1993, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision, 
on September 21, 1993, which left open certain issues to be addressed at the 
November 29, 1993, hearing. The Court, having heard additional evidence, and being 
fully advised in the premises, and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's claims against the Endrody Trust, its real and personal property 
and its trustees and beneficiaries and against Endrody Trucking, Inc., are dismissed, 
with prejudice. 
2. The marital assets of the Plaintiff and Defendant, acquired during the 
course of their marriage, are divided and awarded as follows: 
a. There is no real property owned by the Plaintiff and Defendant and 
no division of real property is necessary. 
b. Personal property: 
(1) To the Plaintiff: 
Equipment Value 
a) Cultivator $150.00 
b) Snapper Lawnmower $75.00 
c) JD Lawnmower $400.00 
d) Heston Swather $5,500.00 
e) Double rake $75.00 
f) Wire baler $5,000.00 
g) Corn planter $500.00 
h) Leveler $2,500.00 
i) JD 2750 Tractor $13,000.00 
j) JD 3 bottom plow $1,500.00 
Total value of farm equipment awarded to Plaintiff: $29,325.00 
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(2) To the Defendant: 
Equipment Value 
a) Hoe and Bale Wagon $12,000.00 
b) Hay loader $1,000.00 
c) JD 4230 Tractor $13,500.00 
Total value of farm equipment awarded to Defendant: $26,500.00 
c. Defendant is awarded, as his separate property, other items 
of farm equipment, currently held by Defendant, which are not listed above and 
which were acquired by the Defendant prior to the marriage of Plaintiff and 
Defendant. 
d. All other items of personal property acquired by Plaintiff and 
Defendant during the course of the marriage shall be held by the party now in 
possession of such personal property, in accordance with the prior Orders of the 
Court, which are not inconsistent with this Judgment and Decree. 
3. There are currently no cattle which are owned by the Plaintiff and 
Defendant, and no award or division of cattle is necessary. 
4. Plaintiff and Defendant are each awarded 3,000 shares of stock in 
Endrody Trucking, Inc. 
5. The Plaintiff and Defenant are ordered to assume and satisfy the debts 
incurred during the period of their marriage, including any periods of separation, in the 
following manner: 
a. Plaintiff is ordered to satisfy any debts incurred by her individually 
during the period of the marriage and during the period of her separation from 
Defendant; 
b. Defendant is ordered to satisfy any debts incurred by him 
individually during the period of the marriage and during the period of his separation 
from Plaintiff; 
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c. The Defendant is also ordered to satisfy any indebtedness owed by 
either Plaintiff or Defendant to Mark McKim. 
6. Defendant is awarded the care, custody and control of the minor children, 
Michael A. Endrody and Linda S. M. Endrody, and Plaintiff is granted reasonable rights 
of visitation with said children. 
7. Plaintiff should pay to Defendant, as and for the benefit and support of the 
minor children, $177.00 per month, as and for child support, which amount is consistent/ 
with Utah's Uniform Child Support Guidelines. Any future modification of child support 
shall be based upon, and consistent with, Utah's Child Support Guidelines. Said child 
support payments shall continue until each child reaches the age of eighteen (18), with 
the Court reserving jurisdiction to continue the child support obligations of Defendant in 
the event that either of the minor children has special needs which warrant a 
continuation of child support. 
8. Plaintiff and Defendant are each ordered to keep and maintain medical 
and dental insurance for the benefit of their minor children, when such insurance 
coverage is available to either or both of them at a reasonable cost or through their 
respective employment. Plaintiff and Defendant are each ordered to pay one-half of all 
medical and dental expenses incurred by the minor children for any medical or dental 
expenses which are not covered by health or dental insurance. 
9. Defendant is ordered to prepare and submit documentation of medical and 
dental bills of the minor children, together with documentation on insurance payments 
for such bills, and Plaintiff is ordered to pay directly, or, where appropriate, to reimburse 
the Defendant for one-half of those expenses which are not covered by then existing 
insurance. The obligation to maintain insurance on the minor children and to pay for 
medical and dental expenses not covered by insurance, shall end as each child reaches 
the age of majority. 
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10. Plaintiff is ordered to pay to Endrody Trust, or its Trustee, the sum of 
$10,200.00, representing one-half of the past due rents owed to Endrody Trust for 
Plaintiffs occupation and possession of a Trust owned residence. Defendant is ordered 
to pay to Endrody Trust, or its Trustee, $10,200.00, representing one-half of the past 
due rents owed to Endrody Trust as a result of Plaintiff's occupation and possession of a 
Trust owned residence. 
11. Plaintiff is entitled to receive alimony and Defendant is ordered to pay 
alimony to Plaintiff in the amount of $300.00 per month, beginning with the month of 
December, 1993. Defendant's obligation to pay alimony to Plaintiff shall terminate upon 
the death, remarriage or cohabitation of Plaintiff, or upon further Order of the Court. 
12. Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff, as and for attorney's fees, the sum 
of $15,000.00, which amount includes $5,000.00 previously paid by the Defendant 
toward Plaintiff's fees. Therefore, Defendant is left owing and is ordered to pay the 
balance of $10,000.00 to Plaintiff for her attorney's fees incurred in this matter. 
13. As a result of the Court's prior finding of contempt against the Defendant, 
the Defendant is ordered to pay $810.00 to the Plaintiff, which amount is meant to 
reimburse Plaintiff for the attorney's fees and costs reasonably associated with 
Defendant's contempt. 
14. The Court orders that the 1,101 shares in Endrody Trust, which are 
currently held by Defendant, be awarded to the parties as follows: 
a. With respect to 550 1/2 of said shares, Defendant should continue 
to hold title to said shares and continue to exercise all rights and receive all benefits 
associated with said shares, including voting rights and rights of distribution. 
b. With respect to the remaining 550 1/2 shares, said shares should 
be held in constructive trust by Defendant, for the use and benefit of Plaintiff. Defendant 
shall continue to hold title to said shares, while Plaintiff is awarded full use and benefit of 
said shares, including voting and distribution rights. 
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c. In accordance with the above-referenced constructive trust, upon 
any distribution to shareholders by the trust, Defendant is ordered to hold that portion of 
said distribution associated with Plaintiff's beneficial interest in 550 1/2 shares, and 
Defendant is ordered to notify Plaintiff of said distribution and to offer Plaintiff her portion 
of any such distribution before any other application of the funds, including 
reinvestment. 
d. Defendant owes a fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, in connection with the 
above-referenced constructive trust, and Defendant is ordered to forward to Plaintiff any 
notices or information provided to Defendant by the Trust, regarding Trust meetings or 
other activities which might affect Plaintiff's beneficial interest in the trust shares or her 
rights with respect thereto. 
15. Plaintiff is awarded one-half of the retirement benefits accumulated by 
Defendant, from the date of the parties' marriage, being the 11th day of April, 1975, until 
the Defendant retired on or about December 14,1991. 
16. The parties shall cooperate in executing such documents as may be 
necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Judgment and Decree. 
17. Should any party fail to comply with the provisions of this Judgment and 
Decree, the nondefaulting party shall be entitled to any costs or expenses, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, incurred in enforcing the provisions hereof. 
18. This Judgment and Order shall become final immediately upon entry by 
the Court. J ^ 
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Approved as to Form and Content 
JAMES M. FfcFfk, E§Q. 
The Park Firm ^ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
LASZLO ENDRODY, JR. 
Defendant, Pro Se 
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ADDENDUM D: Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(e) 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of ap-
pellant to order: notice to appellee if partial tran-
script is ordered. 
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. 
Within iO days after filing the notice of appeal, 
the appellant shall request from the reporter a 
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not 
already on file as the appellant deems necessary. 
The request shall be in writing, and, within the 
same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk 
of the trial court and the clerk of the appellate 
court. If the appellant desires a transcript in a 
compressed format, appellant shall include the 
request for a compressed format within the re-
quest for transcript. If no such parts of the pro-
ceedings are to be requested, within the same 
period the appellant shall file a certificate to that 
effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy 
with the clerk of the appellate court. If there was 
no reporter but the proceedings were otherwise 
recorded, the appellant shall request from a court 
transcriber certified in accordance with the rules 
and procedures of the Judicial Council a tran-
script of such parts of the proceeding not already 
on file as the appellant deems necessary. By stip-
ulation of the parties approved by the appellate 
court, a person other than a certified court tran-
scriber may transcribe a recorded hearing. The 
clerk of the appellate court shall, upon request, 
provide a list of all certified court transcribers. 
The transcriber is subject to all of the obligations 
imposed on reporters by these rules. 
(2) Transcript required of all evidence re-
garding challenged finding or conclusion. If 
the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a 
finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is con-
trary to the evidence, the appellant shall include 
in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant 
to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court 
nor the appellee is obligated to correct appel-
lant's deficiencies in providing the relevant por-
tions of the transcript. 
(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation 
by appellee. Unless the entire transcript is to be 
included, the appellant shall, within 10 days af-
ter filing the notice of appeal, file a statement of 
the issues that will be presented on appeal and 
shall serve on the appellee a copy of the request 
or certificate and a copy of the statement. If the 
appellee deems a transcript of other parts of the 
proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall, 
within 10 days after the service of the request or 
certificate and the statement of the appellant, 
file and serve on the appellant a designation of 
additional parts to be included. Unless within 10 
days after service of such designation the appel-
lant has requested such parts and has so notified 
the appellee, the appellee may within the follow-
ing 10 days either request the parts or move in 
the trial court for an order requiring the appel-
lant to do so. 
ADDENDUM E: Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a) 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal: 
recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Ex-
cept in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the 
court determines that a motion made or appeal taken 
under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it 
shall award just damages, which may include single 
or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reason-
able attorney fees, to the prevailing partv The court 
may order that the damages be paid by the party or 
by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a 
frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one 
that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by exist-
ing law, or not based on a good faith argument to 
extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the pur-
pose of delay is one interposed for any improper pur-
pose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the 
cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only 
the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other 
paper. 
(o Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon re-
quest of any party or upon its own motion. A 
party may request damages under this rule only 
as part of the appellee's motion for summary dis-
position under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's 
brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion 
or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion 
of the court, the court shall issue to the party or 
the party's attorney or both an order to show 
cause why such damages should not be awarded. 
The order to show cause shall set forth the alle-
gations which form the basis of the damages and 
permit at least ten days in which to respond un-
less otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The 
order to show cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom dam-
ages may be awarded, the court shall grant a 
hearing. 
ADDENDUM F: Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a) 
Rule 34. Award of costs. 
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise pro-
vided by law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be 
taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment 
or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against ap-
pellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or 
order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the ap-
pellee unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or or-
der is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs 
shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall 
not be allowed or taxed in a criminal case. 
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In 
cases involving the state of Utah or an agency or 
officer thereof, an award of costs for or against the 
state shall be at the discretion of the court unless 
specifically required or prohibited by law. 
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, 
bonds and other expenses on appeal. The follow-
ing may be taxed as costs in favor of the prevailing 
party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or 
typewritten brief or memoranda and attachments not 
to exceed $3.00 for each page; actual costs incurred in 
the preparation and transmission of the record, in-
cluding costs of the reporters transcript unless other-
wise ordered by the court; premiums paid for superse-
deas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal: 
and the fees for filing and docketing the appeal. 
(d) Bill of costs taxed after remittitur. When 
costs are awarded to a party in an appeal, a party 
claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remitti-
tur is filed with the clerk of the trial court, serve upon 
the adverse party and file with the clerk of the trial 
court an itemized and verified bill of costs. The ad-
verse party may, within 5 days of service of the bill of 
costs, serve and file a notice of objection, together 
with a motion to have the costs taxed by the trial 
court. If there is no objection to the cost bill within 
the allotted time, the clerk of the trial court shall tax 
the costs as filed and enter judgment for the* party 
entitled thereto, which judgment shall be entered in 
the judgment docket with the same force and effect as 
in the case of other judgments of record. If the cost 
bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, the 
clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall tax 
the costs and enter a final determination and judg-
ment which shall thereupon be entered in the judg-
ment docket with the same force and effect as in the 
case of other judgments of record. The determination 
of the clerk shall be reviewable by the trial court 
upon the request of either party made within 5 days 
of the entry of the judgment. 
(e) Costs in other proceedings and agency ap-
peals. In all other matters before the court, including 
appeals from an agency, costs may be allowed as in 
cases on appeal from a trial court. Within 15 days 
after the expiration of the time in which a petition for 
rehearing may be filed or within 15 days after an 
order denying such a petition, the party to whom 
costs have been awarded may file with the clerk of 
the appellate court and serve upon the adverse party 
an itemized and verified bill of costs. The adverse 
party may, within 5 days after the service of the bill 
of costs file a notice of objection and a motion to have 
the costs taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost 
bill is filed within the allotted time, the clerk shall 
thereupon tax the costs and enter judgment against 
